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ABSTRACT

It Is estimated that alcohol plays a factor in between 35 and 64
c'-rcent of all fatal crashes and between 6 and 25 percent for non-fatal
accidents, resulting in alcohol .being involved in about half of the
roughly 50,000 annual traffic fatalities in the United States.

Clearly,

drinking-and driving is a major contributor in both the severity and the
frequency of traffic accidents.
The basic concept of deterrence states that people will refrain
from behavior defined as socially-unaccc.ptable if the resulting
perception and fear of penalties (or sanctions) against such action are
adequately undesirable in comparison to the potential benefits of
behavior.

the

Informal sanctions, those that are channeled through non-

formalized media such as friends, family, or some other relevant
collectivity, are oftentimes considered a much more effective deterrent
for some offenses than are the formal sanctions imposed by the courts.
However, the dynamics of the informal sanction have impeded
research into the individual perceptions and effects of such an elusive
social control mechanism.

It is hypothesized that the presence of

certain personal and social characteristics may be related to the
severity of informal sanctioning radiated from others toward that
person.
This study applies this theoretical foundation to the offense of
DUI.

From November of 1987 through May of 1988, a questionnaire was

administered to a group of 122 people convicted of DUI in Cass County,
North Dakota.

The offenders sampled were participants in the Cass

County First Offender DUI Program, an educative/punitive program

viii

designed as an alternative to jail sentences foi- those deemed by a
license addiction counselor to be free of any chemical dependency
problem.
Upon constructing a scale comprised of 13 Likert-type items, the
following findings were conferred:

social status (income, education,

occupation) showed no relationship with the offenders' perceptions of
informal sanctioning, although the variables of occupational status and
income did so moderately.
Gender proved to be the most discriminating factor in the perceived
severity of informal sanctions, with females markedly more likely to be
sanctioned informally than males.

As an example of the influence of

primary ties on informal sanctions, marital status was an insignificant
factor, as was the presence of an example-setting role (indicated by
whether or not the respondent shared his/her current residence with a
family member under the age of 18).

When combined with marital status,

however, those respondents responding positively to the presence of a
family member under 18 did score higher than both their single and
married counterparts, although not significantly so.
As another example of primary ties, this time to the community, the
length of residence and the size of the community were both found to be
largely insignificant in the perceived severity of informal sanctions.
In the case of size of community of residence, those living within
metropolitan areas (100,000+) did indicate the lowest perceived severity
of informal sanctions related to their DUI than did any other category.
This trend, however, did not emerge consistent as community of residence
increased.
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Chapter I

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Drinking-and-driving in the United States is far from a recent
development.

However, while the cultural presence of alcohol is a long-

established predacessor to the automobile, modern motorized technology
has recently placed a remarkable amount of individual power within the
reach of the majority of adult Americans (Haddon and Blumenthal. forward
in Ross 1984a, p. xiii).
Indeed, the existence of a "drinking-driving problem" in this
country is the result of a procedure by which automobile fatalities have
become a problem of societal concern, to be acted upon by public
officials and agencies (Gusfield 1981, p. 3).

Increasingly stringent

auto safety standards, mandatory use of occupant restraints, and
improvements in highway design have attributed to a continued decrease
in traffic fatalities over the past 20 years.

Nonetheless, although

research disputes exactly how strong an influence alcohol plays in
traffic accidents, the fact that it exacerbates the frequency and
severity of accidents is less a matter of debate.

Ross (1984a)

estimates that alcohol typically plays a role in less than 10 percent of
the run-of-the-mill automobile crashes, about 20 percent of the crashes
resulting in serious injury, about 50 percent of all fatal crashes, and
about 60 percent of all single-vehicle fatal crashes.

Other research

concurs, placing alcohol-involvement at between 35 and 64 percent in
1
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fatal crashes and between 6 and 25 percent for non-fatal accidents
(Roizen 1982) .

This results in alcohol being involved in about half of

the roughly 50,000 annual traffic fatalities in the United States
(Department of Transportation 1968; Jones 1977), making drunk driving a
more common cause of death than international violence (Morris and
Hawkins 1970).
According to estimates published annually by the National Safety
Council (1987), 1985 data from the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration National Accident Sampling System revealed alcohol as a
factor i\i 8 percent of the property damage accidents and 27 percent of
the serious injury accidents.

This means that in 1986 alcohol was a

factor in at least 21,000 fatal accidents, about 320,000 injury
accidents, and about 1,300,000 property damage accidents (National
Safety Council 1987, p. 52).
However, while the effects of such a relationship are widely
accepted, some researchers have questioned the uniqueness of alcohol as
a causal agent in traffic collision-involvement, focusing on
multivariate rather than univariate explanations (Zylman 1972a; 1972b:
Phillips, Ray, and Votey 1984).

Clearly, the precise impact between the

two is still unknown.
Wien examining specific age cohorts in relation to traffic
fatalities, those between the ages of 15 and 24 are considerably
overrepresented in motor-vehicle traffic fatality statistics.

According

to the National Safety Council (1987), drivers in this age group have
the highest death rates of any age group, with about 40 deaths per
100,000 population.

The next highest traffic fatality cohort is that of

drivers aged 75 and over, with slightly less than 30 deaths per 100,000
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population (National Safety Council 1987).
This latter estimate is imperative to the argument that alcohol is
the primary factor affecting driver fatalities.

Since it has been

established that alcohol use is most highly represented in the younger
age cohorts (Cosper and Mozersky 1968; Yoder and Moore 1973; Pelz,
McDole, and Schuman 1975; Carlson 1973;), it might seem less than
coincidental that this same age group also exhibits the highest death
rate of any age cohort.

However, this correlation loses it's viability

when applied to the oldest age cohort.

Perhaps the least represented

with regard to alcohol consumption, the death rate remains overly
escalated in comparison.

Alternative explanations concerning the age-

specific relationship between alcohol and traffic fatalities abound
within the drug and social science literature (Tillman and Hobbs 1968;
Carlson and Klein 1970; Klein 1968; Carroll, Carlson, McDole, and Smith
1970).

Thus, while alcohol is undoubtedly a relevant factor, it's

precise impact upon driver injuries and fatalities is still unknown.
In addition to these human costs, monetary costs of drinkingand-driving (e.g., vehicle damage) have been estimated at $8-10
billion annually (Cramton 1968).

More current estimates place the

annual cost of alcohol-related motor-vehicle accidents at about $12
billion (National Safety Council 1987).

Many other less tangible

impacts can also be attributed either directly or indirectly to drunk
driving. such as social stigmatization, loss of status, and even
potential loss of employment (Flygare 1983) .

4

Public Sentiment

The perception of the drunk-driving offense has undergone a number
of transitions, many of which have, occurred only within the past several
years.

A major transformation has been from a victimless crime to one

which implies a moral failure of the individual offender (Ross 1984a).
This is due in part to the public creation of what Gusfield (1981) calls
"the myth of the killer drunk".
Other social 'transformations of drinking-and-driving are less
recent and more cultural in nature.

For instance, prior to the

nineteenth century, drinking and drunkenness were seldom used to
account for accidents or crime (Gusfield 1981).

The emphasis in

cartoons and fiction was less on the tragedy involved than on the
supposed humor of such situations (Smith 1926), a view Ross (1984)
maintains exists to some extent even today.
However, while all "socially responsible" parties will attest to
the illegality of DUI (DUIA and DWI), criminologists and sociologists
alike remain uncertain as to it's appropriate classification.

For

example, Ross (1960) identified DUI as a "folk crime", or one which
shares similar characteristics with other deviant acts such as whitecollar and welfare chiseling.

As opposed to "ordinary criminals," folk

criminals are relatively numerous, unstigmatized, and differentially
treated in the legal process (Ross 1960, p. 237).
Similarly, Gibbons (1983, p. 213) characterized Ross's "folk crime"
within the broader category of "mundane crime", a variety of
commonplace, low visibility, and often innocuous forms of lawbreaking
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found in abundance in American society.
However, the dramatic transformation regarding the severity of

I

formal' punishments for driving-while-impaired lead us to believe that
such a shift represents an equally dramatic change in public sentiment.
The current view of accidents as results of individual driver
performance has become the dominant theme in the cultural organization
of accident reality in the United States (Gusfield 1981. p. 41).
Gusfield (1981) further summarizes society's current focus on
explaining impaired-driving on a micro rather than a macro level by his
experience studying the San Diego court systems in the early 1970s:

".......... it was taken for granted by those 1 studied that
the problems of auto safety and alcohol were chiefly problems
of individuals, of motorists.
Institutional explanations and
loci of responsibility were eloquently absent from the
consciousness of officials, observers, offenders" (Gusfield
1981, p. 7).

This focus on the individual also signaled a closely related change
in public perception of the causal factors involved in what has now
evolved into a full-fledged public problem, complete with a dominant
aura of implied intentionality and moral failure.

In his earlier work,

Gusfield (1963) noted that the drunk as an offender was transformed from
a repentant (or sick) deviant to that of an enemy.

Thus, over the

period of automobile use in the United States, emphases within the
"unsafe driver" theory have shifted from careless but competent drivers
to incompetent drivers to special categories of "accident-prone" drivers
including the young, the very old, and the alcohol-impaired (Gusfield
.1981, p. 45).
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However, while researchers recognize a definite relationship
between public sentiment and imposed legal sanctions, the direction of
such a relationship is unclear.

Common sense tells us that within a

democratic government, the laws represent the will of the majority, a
viewpoint Gusfield (1981) questions in regard to the drunk-driving
problem in the United States.
Changing public sentiment is an essential component to evaluating
the deterrent framework within which the issue of sanctions are most
often dealt.

For instance, Ross (1984a) attributes the recent deluge of

deterrence-based DUI legislation as a direct result of the anti-drunkdriving movement, comprised of such organizations as MADD, SADD, REDDI,
and RID.

Other researchers argue that informal sanctions (e.g.,

negative public reactions, etc.) are an imperative prerequisite for
effective legal sanctions (Gibbs 1975, p. 85; Jensen 1969; Salem and
Bowers 1970; Tittle and Row

1974).

In any case, it is generally conceded that individual perceptions
of sanction characteristics are probably more important than the actual
characteristics of sanctions (Geerken and Gove 1975; Gibbs 1975; Teevan
1972; Tittle and Logan 1973).

After all, people can and do misperceive

reality and it follows that they are likely to act on what they believe
to be true regardless of whether it is actually true (Tittle 1980,
p. 10).

As stated by Waldo and Chiricos (1972):

’’........ clearly, the deterrent effectiveness of punishment
presumes that potential offenders know or think they know whal
the penalties are.
Further, it must be assumed that offenders
and non-offenders act on the basis of their knowledge (Waldo
and Chiricos 1972, p p . 525-525, emphasis theirs).
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Tittle and Logan (1973) extend this viewpoint further, stating that
the possibility exists that deterrence in general may be more a matter
of belief than of reality.

It is possible that the effectiveness of

sanctions hinges on the perceived certainty of their imposition, a
factor which may vary from individual to individual and from social
group to social group (Tittle and Logan 1973, p. 380).

DUI as Deviant Behavior

Although many societal motives which are woven into complex
sociological theories attempt to explain why certain behavior is deviant
and who benefits from judging it as such, deviance defined is less
ambiguous.

Simply stated, the essense of deviance is behavior held in

disrepute by most people in a given social context (Tittle 1980, p. 42).
However, Tittle (1980) goes on to argue that deviance is evaluated
on the status of the behavior, not on its rarity or typicality.

That

is, if DUI is evaluated as deviant behavior by most people in a given
social situation, it will continue to be classified as such even though
most people in that same social context actually practice it (Tittle
1980, p. 43).
A more appropriate and accepted method of defining deviance is in
terms of social sanctions.

Schur (1971) describes deviance as

disapproved behavior about which something is done, while others argue
that only those behaviors that evoke active reactions from a
collectivity (or audience) of from formal agents of that collectively
can be considered deviant (Tittle 1980, p. 44).
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From the review of the most recent information available, it
appears impossible to confidently define the offense of DUI in terms of
societal reactions on anything less than a regional basis.

While

stating that the collective sentiment toward DUI within the United
States has undoubtedly harshened is a safe conclusion, the varying
degrees to which this is the case is clearly more a regional phenomenon.
To use the extended sample environment of North Dakota as an example,
the public's perception of DUI appears to be largely the result of
community and regional involvement rather than the direct result of any
state or nationally-established mandates.
With the implementation of various opposition groups such as MADD,
SADD, REDDI, etc., certain communities have initiated a state of public
awareness within their respective environments.

By the same token,

however, a lack of organized community response -groups has resulted in a
seemingly unaware if not apathetic approach to the DUI problem in some
areas.

Definition of the offense of DUI, it seems, is dependent largely

upon well-organized community-based opposition.
Nonetheless, based upon considerable personal experience and
involvement in the DUI issue at both the state and local level, it is
this researcher's opinion that the attitude toward DUI within the
immediate survey area is one of something more than simply a traffic
offense.

Personal implications, dissemination of legal sanctions, and

feasible alternatives to driving after drinking are among the most
pertinent messages communicated by public education programs, the mass
media, and community workshops.
While other communities have managed similar attempts to sway the
public perception of DUI away from that of a "folk crime" (see Ross
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1960), such efforts often fall short due to an inability to sustain
furding, community involvement, or both.

It appears that the

responsibility of attributing to DUI the serious connotation it deserves
lies in the hands of community leaders, progressive educators, and
concerned citizens.

The Deterrence Model

Before progressing to the issue of offender perceptions of
sanctions, the issue of deterrence must be addressed, for it is within
this equation that the true effect of these perceptions is most
essential.

Simply stated, deterrence is the omission of an act as a

response to the perceived risk and fear of punishment for contrary
behavior (Gibbs 1975, p. 2

emphasis his).

Such a concept, although having established itself long before
modern-day exchange theory, is perhaps the most obvious and commonplace
example of weighing risk of sanction against outcomes of reward. Indeed,
the fundamental premise of criminal justice is that people fear
punishment and will obey the law if it provides a sufficient sanction
threat (Tittle 1980, p. 1).

As applied to traffic laws, Zimring and

Hawkins (1973) maintain that in order for criminal law enforcement to be
an effective deterrent for drunk-driving, a theoretical assumption is
made that the individual motorist can be led to more diligent driving
through fear of police apprehension and legal punishment.
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Current Legal Sanctions

The 1983 report of the Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving
reported that during the previous year, thirty-nine states had enacted
"improved" legislation.

As quoted by Ross (1984a, p. 117),

"legislators, enforcement officials, prosecutors, and judges around the
country have responded to society's demands by enacting more effective
legislation, apprehending more offenders, effectively prosecuting
offenders, and meting out more appropriate sanctions."
In a related effort to combat the problem of youthful
overrepresentation among the country's traffic fatalities, a Federal
mandate threatening forfeiture of millions of dollars of statetargeted highway appropriations was implemented, resulting in virtually
all fifty states have either raising or agreeing to maintain a legal
minimum drinking age of twenty-one.

In addition, jail sentences (in

some cases even for first offenders), chemical evaluation, drivers
license suspension, and minimum fine are among the most common mandatory
legal sanctions enacted into law by many state legislatures.
In 1983, the 48th Legislative Assembly of the State of North Dakota
enacted and amended sections of Title 39 of the North Dakota Century
Code (NDCC) dealing with DUI, drivers license suspension/revoc.ation,
implied consent, and sentencing (See Table 1).

It should be noted that

these mandatory sanctions applied only to DUI during their original
conception, but were expanded to include the offense of actual physical
control (APC) in 1988.

Other major provisions should also be noted.

For those offenders 18 years of age or older who, because of drug

11
-impaired driving, cause the serious injury of another person, a minimum
one-year incarceration for each death and ninety consecutive days for
each injury is prescribed.

Table 1.

Legal Sanctions for DUI in North Dakota
FIRST TIME OFFENDER

1.
2.
3.

A fine of at least $250 ($500 maximum)
A 90-day license suspension (maximum 30 days
imprisonment)
A mandatory referral for an addiction facility for
chemical dependency diagnosis

SECOND TIME OFFENDER (within five years)
1.
2.

3.
4.

A $500 fine
Four (4) days imprisonment or ten (10) days
community service work (if imprisoned, then 48
hours must be consecutively served) (30 days
imprisonment maximum)
A license suspension of at least one (1) year
A mandatory referral
to an addiction facility for
diagnosis and subsequent in-patient/out-patient treatment

THIRD TIME OFFENDER (within five years)
1.
2.
3.
4.

A $1,000 fine
Sixty (60) days imprisonment (maximum one (1) year
imprisonment)
A license suspension of at least one (1) year
A mandatory referral
to an addiction facility for diagnosis
and subsequent in-patient/out-patient treatment

FOURTH TIME OFFENDER (within seven years)
1.
2.
3.

A $1,000 fine
One hundred and eighty (180) days imprisonment
(maximum one (1) year imprisonment)
Driving privileges may be restored only after the offender
has completed addiction treatment and has not committed any
alcohol-related offenses of any kind for at least two (2)
consecutive years following subsequent in-patient/outpatient treatment
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It is stressed that these legal sanctions are mandatory minimum
requirements.

That is, mimimum sanctions do not prevent a court from

imposing the maximum sentence allowed by law.

The mandatory minimum

punishments were legally prescribed in part to elicit from the various
courts some type of collective consistency in DUI sentencing.

These

minimum punishments, however, do not take away from the individual
discretion of the preciding justice.
For instance, in DUI cases which involve "atypical" circumstances
such as property damage, reckless disregard for human life, past
criminal record, etc., the sentence may be imposed at it's fullest
severity.

In other more "typical" DUI offenses, the legally prescribed

minimum may be applied.

Unfortunately, the system falls short in it's

quest for consistency due to a lack of organized court monitoring and a
seemingly impotent ability to sanction judges who fail to sentence
offenders with the legally prescribed minimum.

In Grand Forks County

Court in 1986, an elected county official was sentenced well-below the
legal mandatox*y minimum punishment despite his second DUI conviction in
less than five years.

From various reports, sentencing discrepancies

within North Dakota courts are not uncommon.

Empirical Research

£Jext to cancer, traffic-related fatalities are the most costly
source of morbidity and mortality in modern societies.

Despite the

drunk drivers' apparent major role in causing them, up to now alcoholimpaired driving has been largely overlooked by sociologists, even those
oriented toward social policy (Ross 1984b, p p . 23-24).

Indeed, as Ross
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(1984b) also points out, because of the Individual and often
atheoretical focus of drinking-and-driving studies, much of the
literature remains relatively obscure and inaccessible.
A substantial portion of the existing research on sanctions
maintains a focus on the deterrent effects of perceived sanctionfears on the self-reported incidence of deviant behavior (Salem and
Bowers 1970; Tittle and Rowe 1973; Tittle and Logan 1973; Ross 1976;
Ross and Blumenthal 1974; Ross 1984b; Shover, Bankston, and Gurley 1977;
Anderson, Chiricos, and Waldo 1977; Tittle 1969; Grasmick and Green
1980; Schwartz and Orleans 1980; Tittle 1977; Cramton 1969).

In the

quest for identifying sanction-related factors which maximize
deterrence, the end product is quite often an attempt to discern the
strength or influence of such factors (i.e., certainty, severity, etc).
Admittedly, from both a policy and a research standpoint, such a focus
is indeed beneficial.

However, there is a general lack of empirical

concensus regarding the social mechanisms through which these factors
effectively precipitate sanction fear; that is, why they do what they
do.
As Cohen (1966) points out, most major theories of deviant behavior
developed within the last century have given little attention to
sanctions, choosing instead to emphasize motivations stemming from
unusual normative contexts, failure of conventional socialization,
psychodynamic problems, or pressure generated by social contexts.

With

few exceptions, sociologists have been preoccupied with the sources of
deviant behavior rather than reactions to deviant behavior (Clark and
Gibbs 1965, p. 399, emphasis mine).
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With this in mind, Tittle and Logan in 1972 reviewed the literature
and concluded that "enough suggestive evidence has been compiled to
warrant systematic research efforts and to mandate serious theoretical
consideration of the role of sanctions in human behavior and social
organization" (Tittle and Logan 1973, p. 385).

Since that time, it

I
appears research trends have in fact taken a narrower focus on the
deterrent effects of formal and informal sanctions, addressing the
impacts of specific sanctions on more typical acts of deviant behavior.

Need for this Research

Sanctions and the subsequent fear of sanctions comprise the
integral premise of the central notion of compliance with norms, an
essential prerequisite to the workings of a cohesive, coherent society.
Ideally, they change in parallel with the dynamics of societal values,
reflecting an informal public sentiment which is transformed into a
formalized public policy.

All too often, however, research has focused

on only those issues defined by the majority as bonafide public
problems.

Because of this, little is known of drinking-and-driving

prior to the 1970s.
Today, DUI has gained acceptance as'a problem warranting social
concern.

Researchers should take advantage of the public interest and

potential benefits current attention could yield, through both
innovative approaches as well as maintenance of historically established
foci.

In any case, the need to formulate and maintain the interest is

essential to understanding and explaining the DUI phenomenon in the
context of a changing culture.
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Another major downfall of the sanction-related research is the
specific exclusion of DUI as deviant activity.

As commonplace as

drinking-and-driving is within the United States, DUI should be viewed
as a unique violation in countless respects.

For instance , it carries

larger and more costly mandatory sanctions than does shoplifting,
indicating that society collectively sees drunk-driving as more serious
than stealing.

However, DUI citations continue to be commonplace and

relatively unstigmatized, indicating that being labeled a drunk-driver
holds a less negative reaction in our culture than does being labeled a
thief.
In her review of the literature, Vegega (1983, p. 2) concluded that
very little information is available on attitudes about drinking-and driving (i .e ., to what degree people consider DUI a problem, their
willingness to work towards a solution, etc., emphasis hers).
Thus, the time to recognize drunk-dri\ring as a separate entry in
the annals of deviant Dehavior is long overdue.

As such, it should be

afforded at least the same expenditure of resources and creativity as is
delinquency, mental health, and numerous other norm violations of
varying severity.

The dynamics of society also demand that DUI be

evaluated and classified in the context of modern subcultures as well as
cultures.

This study attempts to extend this reasoning.to the area of

DUI-related sanctions within specific environments.
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Summary of the Problem

As previously eluded to, drinking-and-driving is not new; what is
new, however, it it's evolution from what C. Wright Mills (1959) called
a "private matter" to a "public concern."

Indeed, researchers and

reformers now accept drunk-driving as problematic in our society.

As

Ross (1984a, p. 123) concludes, "I think we must accept the prognosis
that no measures will eliminate drunk driving; the best we can do will
be to reduce it."

Preview

The proceeding study attempts to distinguish the prevalence and
severity of informal sanctioning (in this case negative informal
sanctioning) of convicted DUI offenders based upon their individual
perceptions.

A scale comprising the various domains of informal

sanctions has been constructed by which to plot the severity of informal
sanctions across specified biographical lines.
Chapter Two will provide a comprehensive overview of relevant
related empirical and theoretical research as it pertains to DUI,
deviant behavior, and social sanctions.

In addition, the theoretical

framework of this study will be established, as will the dependent and
independent variables to be utilized.

Lastly, the specific hypotheses

to be tested will be outlined.
Chapter Three provides a methodological overview of the study.
Basic characteristics of the sample, the sampling procedure, and issues
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of representativness and subsequent generalizability are addressed, as
well as the potential downfalls of the sample and the respective data
set.

Also included within Chapter Three are the primary variables,

their level and means of measurement, and preliminary statistical
methods justifying creation of the variable transformations (i.e.,
informal sanctioning scale).
Chapter Four provides the statistical analyses and findings
addressed in Chapter Three combined with the theoretical foundations
contained within Chapter Two.

Specific analytic procedures such as

tests of significance, measures of association, and causal analysis are
demonstrated and their respective findings shown.

The results of each

related analysis will be compared to the previously stated hypotheses as
being either supportive, non-supportive, or inconclusive.
The final chapter, Chapter Five, contains the conclusion of the
study.

Comprised of the statistical findings in Chapter Four combined

with the theoretical foundations outlined in Chapter Two, the concluding
remarks summarize the potential benefits of the findings.

In this case,

a substantial portion of the conclusion will focus on potential policy
implications regarding the informal sanctioning of DUI as it relates to
basic deterrence.

Chapter II

THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

Research on social sanctioning has historically maintained a
preoccupation with the deterrent effects of various sanctions, with
issues such as severity, celerity, and certainty of punishment among the
most frequently scrutinized variables.

Indeed, many such studies focus

on the serious but statistically atypical criminal deviant acts such as
murder, robbery, and.theft which occur within a society (Chiricos and
Waldo 1970; Waldo and Chiricos 1972; Erickson, Gibbs, and Jensen 1977).
On the opposite end of the deviance spectrum, various other studies
utilize this same deterrence theme using less serious offenses such as
general traffic violations (Sigelman and Sigelman 1976; Middendorff
1968; Shoham 1974; Shoham, Geva, Markowski, and Kaplinsky 1976).
Similarly, other related research has concentrated on deviant drinking
behavior (Nathan 1983; Larsen and Abu-Laban 1968) while still others
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have chosen to address the deterrence issue with an emphasis on the
social-psychological construct of risk perception (Claster 1967; Sinha
1967).
Due in large part to the recognition of drinking-driving and DUI as
a bonafide social problem, research incorporating deterrence with
drinking-driving has only recently become a fertile topical area for
researchers and policymakers (Ross 1984a; Gusfield 1981).

Major studies

linking the notion of deterrence to drinking-driving and DUI have been
18
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applied to national as well as international populations (Ross 1975;
1976; 1977; 1984; Ennis 1977;).

The Deterrence Model

Based on the writings of classical thinkers and philosophers
(Beccaria 1963; Bentham 1962), the.concept of deterrence states that the
rate for a particular type of crime varies inversely with the celerity,
certainty, and severity of punishments of that type of crime.

Indeed,

the fundamental premise of criminal justice is that people fear
punishment and will obey the law if it provides a sufficient sanction
threat (Tittle 1980, p. 1).

Thus, according to Gibbs (1975), deterrence

in it's most basic form is the omission of an act as a response to the
perceived risk and fear of punishment for contrary behavior (emphasis
his) .
Cooper (1973, p. 164) defines deterrence as "any measure designed
actively to impede, discourage, or restrain the way in which another
might think or act."

Zimring and Hawkins (1973, p. 7) define deterrence

as "principally a matter of the delcaration of some harm, loss, or pain
that will follow noncompliance; in short, the central concept is that of
threat."
However, Gibbs (1975, p. 2) makes a critical point in regard to
both definitions:

while the deterrence doctrine focuses specifically on

crime and its related punishments, the term "punishment" is ambiguous in
that it may refer to prescribed punishments (e.g., statutory penalties)
or to actual punishments (emphases his).

Hence, subsequently, when the

term, is used without qualification, it refers to prescribed and/or
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actual punishments (Gibbs 1975, p. 3).
Because prescribed, legal punishments ere more easily measured and
less dynamic than actual punishments given offenders, it serves as a
more consistent and reliable construct of punishment than do the
more peripheral informal punishments.

However, exclusion of such actual

punishments because of this hindrance threatens the validity of Gibb's
(1975) definition of punishment.
Imperative to this analysis is the notion of specific deterrence
put forth by criminologists and other social scientists.

According to

Gibbs (1975, p. 34), the deterrence doctrine is likely to be
misunderstood and rejected unless critics recognize two categories of
individuals:

1) those who have suffered a punishment for having

committed a crime and 2) those who have not.

This distinction is of

imperative relevance because the deterrence doctrine can be construed as
asserting that individuals who have suffered a punishment for a type of
crime are deterred from further offenses (Gibbs 1975, p. 34).

This

critical period of specific deterrence, therefore, commences after the
punishment of someone in response to the criminal acts of the individual
in question.

Sanctions Defined

Sanctions are defined as reactions by others that are unpleasant
for the perpetrator of a deviant act regardless of whether those
reactions are planned or whether they are intended to be unpleasant
(Tittle 1980, p. 33).

In his publication Sanctions and Social Deviance.

Tittle (1980, p. 33) illustrates the relationship among the concepts of
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deviance, deterrence, and social sanctions:

deterrence is a curtailment

of deviance by sanctions.
Although they generally carry a punitive connotation, social
sanctions are frequently differentiated as positive and negative
sanctions.

Positive sanctions constitute those positive

reinforcements which reward one for conformist behavior while negative
sanctions are those which penalize one for failing to comply to
established norms.

Applied to DUI, positive sanctions could take the

form of reduced auto insurance rates for maintaining a good driving
record while negative sanctions are more easily identifiable, such as
loss of license or monetary fine.

However, our legal system contains

very few instances in which people are explicitly rewarded for
comoliance, rather than punished for deviance (Schwartz and Orleans
1967, p. 280).
Social learning theorists have long recognized the importance of
sanctions as they apply to deterrence.

In a modernized recapitulation

of Sutherland's classic differential association theory of deviant
behavior, Akers (1973) outlines the sanctioning aspects of reinforcement
and punishment.
Reinforcement is the effect the reactions of others have upon the
impending behavior of others.

In less technical terms, sometimes our

behavior is met by reactions from others (or has some other consequences
attached to it) which influence us to do the same thing again under
similar circumstances (Akers 1973, p. 49).

Consequently, when the

events following behavior have the effect of repressing or weakening it
(technically decreasing the rate at which it is emitted), we say that
punishment has occurred (Akers 1973, p. 50).
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Akers's conception of the processes of social control closely
parallels the related concepts of positive and negative social
sanctions.

Indeed, as he also distinguishes between positive and

negative reinforcement and punishment, the similarities are evident.
However, the origins of these control mechanisms are not of primary
concern.

Although Akers's social learning theory recognizes that

reinforcements and punishments need not be tangible (fines, loss of
license, etc.), little distinction is drawn between these and the more
dynamic and elusive non-tangible punishments and reinforcements (i.e.,
loss of occupational status, loss of self-respect, etc.).

For this

reason, despite it's formidable application to sanctioning of the DUI
offender, the basic premise of formal and informal sanctions are of
greater benefit.
Theorists continue to disagree with regard to the content validity
of informal sanctions as a methodological construct, or the extent to
which empirical measurement reflects a specific domain of content
(Carmines and Zeller 1979).

Despite this discrepancy, a clear

distinction between the two classifications is consistently made.
Informal sanctions are those threatened or imposed by friends,
relatives, or a personally relevant collectivity while formal sanctions
are formalized penalties imposed by a court of law or by some routinized
procedures (Tittle 1980, p p . 9-10).

While other researchers (Schwartz

and Orleans 1967) distinguish this latter category as legal sanctions,
the definition is virtually identical.
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Relationships

Although the deterrence theme is central to the argument that
various sanctions and their related characteristics impact the risk
perception of various individuals differently, it is impossible to take
all relevant variables into account to attribute the effect uniquely to
sanctions (Tittle 1980).

Similarly, the effectiveness of sanctioning

practices are largely dependent upon individual perceptions, which may
differ radically from individual to individual and social group to
social group.
For this reason, while it may be equally beneficial to plot the
specific deterrent effect of formal and informal sanctions over time
following the punishment, the actual individual perceptions of the
implementation of sanctions is of vital importance in the deterrence
equation.

Research has documented that sanction fear is translated

through individual perceptions, which in turn are based largely in part
on individual experiences and the experiences of significant others
(Tittle 1980).

Empirical Research

Most major theories in deviant behavior developed in this century
gave little attention to sanctions.

Instead, they emphasized causes of

deviance rather than society's response to deviance (Tittle 1980, p. 1;
Clark and Gibbs 1965, p. 399).

"j
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Perhaps one of the most commonly addressed issues in criminology
coday is whether or not those arrested accurately reflect the population
of law violators in society (Hollinger 1984).

Not surprisingly then,

many researchers have taken an epidemiological approach by focusing on
biographical characteristics of documented offenders in hopes of
discerning those most at risk (Hollinger 1984; Borkenstein, Crowther,
Shumate, Ziel, and Zylman 1969; Gurnack 1986; Cosper and Mozersky 1968;
Vegega 1983; Carlson 1973; Yoder and Moore 1973; YToder 1975; Pelz,
McDole, and Schuman 1975; Beck and Summons 1985; Zung 1984; Hurst 1973;
Pandiani and McGrath 1986).
Perhaps the two major research areas of recent emphasis have dealt
with determining the extent to which alcohol impacts traffic accidents
and the extent to which certain biographical variables may explain the
overrepresentation of certain social groups in the arrest statistics.
The former has been briefly touched upon in the preceeding chapter
simply for illustrative puropses and thus will not be elaborated upon
further.

Empirical evidence concerning driver characteristics will be

summarized in order to establish a foundation on which to base the
upcoming analyses between many of these same biographical variables and
driver perceptions of informal sanctions.

Driver Characteristics

Research has documented that various social groups and subgroups
are consistently overrepresented in DUI statistics.

For instance,

Zylman (1972b) found that found that drivers of lower social class were
overrepresented in the high blood-alcohol content (BAC) and collision
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groups.

Similarly, Hollinger (1984) found that lower ocupational status

drivers showed up significantly more often than higher occupational
status individuals in the arrested DUI population.

Other studies have

established a similar link using the construct of socioeconomic status
(SES) (Yoder 1975; Hyman 1968; Borkenstein, Crowther. Shumate, Ziel, and
Zylman 1969).
Pelz, McDole, and Schuman (1975) examined age on accident
involvement in a sample of 1,670 young males and found the highest
accident rates without alcohol involvement occurred in the 18-20 age
group, while the most alcohol-related accidents occurred in the age
range of 22-24 (empahsis mine).

In a similar study, Carlson (1973) also

found evidence to suggest that these over-involvements are consistent
with the learning-to-drive and learning-to-drink-and-drive model of
crash occurrence.

Also with an emphasis on accident involvement,

Borkenstein, Crowther, Shumate, Ziel, and Zylman (1969) found those
classes with the worst accident experience to be (in addition to
intoxicated) the young or very old, the inexperienced, and those with
less formal education.
In a more stringent attempt to sketch a hypothetical profile of
those most at risk, Mulford (1961) discerned from a quota sample of the
Iowa population that drinking drivers were disproportionately male, aged
20-40, disproportionately college educated, overrepresented in upper
white-collar, skilled and unskilled occupations, and underrepresented in
clerical, sales, semi-skilled and farming occupations.

Gurnack (1986).

in her sample of DUI offenders in two Wisconsin couni ics>, found that
offenders tended to be young, unmarried, and with high school
educations.
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Relationships
A eb
Relative to younger persons, older people tend to be less willing
to take risks.

Conversely, social status is also largely a function of

age, with statuses and roles that are dependent upon favorable reactions
of others (Zimring and Hawkins 1973).

Sigelman and Sigelman (1976)

found that younger people are less likely to succumb to the threat of
sanctions in altering their behavior.

Consequently, one would expect

older people to be more sensitive to the threat of informal social
sanctions.

Socioeconomic Status (SES)
The issue of socioeconomic status and it's relationship to sanction
fear continues under debate.

The social-psychological school of thought

maintains that higher'status people should be more sensitive to
sanctions than lower class people (Geerken and Gove 1975; Zimring and
Hawkins 1973; Tittle 1969).

Built upon the basic assumptions of

exchange theory, Zimring and Hawkins (1973) also contend that higher
status people simply have more to lose if caught.

Homans (1961),

however, argues that middle status persons are ‘lie most sensitive to
sanctions because they have something to lose, but lack sufficientstatus to risk anything.

Conventional Ties /Mar ital .Status
In his theoretical work in the areas of delinquency and other
deviant behavior, Hirschi (1969) argues that those who maintain

27
conventional ties to society are more sensitive to sanction threats
simply because they have more to lose by negative sanctions.
Thus, one could hypothesize that those most involved in social
relationships will be more constrained and subsequently be more prone to
perceiving informal sanctioning as severe.

Those who are single, since

they are exposed to fewer social bonds (in terms of marital status)
should be less sensitive to informal sanctioning than those married
offenders.

Assuming this, the separated/divorced and widowed should

fall between these two extremes (Tittle 1980, p p . 123-124).

Similarly,

the presence of a role of "example setter" should also prove to be a
substantial force in the establishment of conventional ties.

One might

then expect the obligation of adolescent and pre/adolescent
socialization to be a factor in the perception of the severity of
informal social sanctions.

Conventi onal Ties/Social Integration
Some social theorists (Geerken and Gove 1975) maintain that more
informal communication patterns enable smaller, more cohesive
communities to radiate more of a deterrent effect.

Since formal

sanctions are largely held constant, the only feasible variation would
appear to be that of informal sanctioning.

Thus, those offenders

maintaining these more conventional ties with their surrounding
environment may be subject to more severe social sanctioning simply by
virtue of the size of the community.
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Community Cohesion/Geographic Mobi1itv
People who change residences often should be less constrained by
the possibility of negative reactions from others (informal sanctions)
because they are less dependent upon a given reference group for
positive response (Tittle 1980, p. 21).

If this theory holds firm, one

would expect that those more firmly integrated into a society will
perceive the severity of informal sanctions to be greater than those who
do not yet occupy a legitimate, functioning part of the status network.

Hypotheses

As previously stated, most recent research on sanctions has either
not focused on DUI. has failed to methodologically incorporate an
acceptable distinction between formal and informal sanctions, or has
not theoretically extended the statistical correlations between
sanctions and certain offender characteristics.
This being the case, the nature of this study is largely
exploratory.

However, several hypotheses can be explored:

1) persons

of higher social status will tend to perceive informal sanctions as more
severe than will those of lesser social status; 2) females will tend to
perceive informal sanctions as more severe than males; 3) persons with
socially-defined behavior-setting roles (i.e., parents, brothers,
sisters, managerial persons, etc.) will perceive informal sanctions as
more severe than will those under no such social obligations; A) people
maintaining close primary ties (i.e., marriage) will perceive informal
sanctions as more severe than those not married (single, divorced,
separated, widowed); 5) persons indicating longer present residences
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will perceive informal sanctions as more severe;, and 6) persons from
smaller, more personal environments (rural vs. metro) will perceive
informal sanctions as more severe.

Chapter III

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

This study is based on data collected from convicted DUI offenders
in Cass County, North Dakota.

Utilizing an epidemiological approach,

the purpose of this study is to examine the relationships of perception
of informal sanctioning of individual offenders based upon the
biographical characteristics of gender, occupation, education, income,
community cohesion (length of residence), and primary ties (marriage,
family),

Dot a Co.llc..Ct-i,on

The data for this study was collected from convicted violators of
alcohol-related driving offenses required to participate in the Cass
County First Offender DUI Program.

Held on an "on demand” basis, this

72-hour punitive/educative program is designed as a supplement to the
mandatory minimum punishment prescribed by law.
To ensure maximum compliance in regard to questionnaire completion
the instrument was cooperatively designed with program staff and
subsequently adopted as an official portion of their program curriculum
Thus, while participation was not mandatory to successful completion of:
the program, it may have been assumed as such by some participants.
Nonetheless, the option of refusal was available and exercised by a
30
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number of participants.

All respondents were guaranteed absolute

anonymity and encouraged to be honest in their responses.

The

average class size contained about fifteen participants.
Using a 6 -page questionnaire designed, pre-tested, and re-designed
specifically fcr this study and sample population, one hundred twenty
two program participants were surveyed in eight sessions from September,
1987 through May. 1988.

Of these, eighteen respondents refused to

participate in the study, another ten wore participating for offense(s)
other than DUI, and two gave no response.

Thus, an overall response

rate of 85.2 percent was obtained, although the final usable sample size
consisted of 96.
'The questionnaire consisted of four basic sections:

1) a series of

Liker l -scaled attitudinal items reflecting the respondents' viewpoints
on DUI in general;

2) a similar series of Likert-scaled attitudinal

items designed to measure responsents' perceptions of informal
sanctioning related to their individual DUI;

3) a series of items

recording basic biographical characteristics; and A) a series of scaled
and open-ended items reflecting respondent's past drinking-driving
behavior and the identification of significant others in regard to
informal sanctioning.
The first section was provided as a gauge to reflect respondent's
attitudes toward DUI, and was included primarily as a data-gathering
source to be used as an educational tool by pi'ogram counselors in future
classes.

It consisted of twenty-seven items rated on a 5-point Likert

scale which ranged in content from respondent viewpoints regarding DUI
apprehension, legal treatment of DUI, and perception of DUI offenders in
general.

Statements reflecting these areas were given, and respondents
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were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with
each. * The response categories ranged from "strongly agree" to "strongly
disagree", with the middle category being neutral.
The second group consisted of twenty-six items based upon a similar
5 -point Likert scale which asked for respondents' views on their own
individual DUI.

From these, a 13-item scale measuring the construct of

informal sanctioning was constructed.

Items regarding the perceived

feelings and actions of various significant others toward their DUI
offense were formulated in statements which again asked respondents to
indicate their level of agreement or disagreement.

As before,

respondents were given a choice of five possible responses:

1) strongly

agree; 2) agree; 3) neutral; 4) disagree; and 5) strongly disagree.

Sample Population

The working sample size consisted of ninety-six respondents
convicted of DUI, indicating they were tested and found to be legally
impaired at the time of their apprehension (BAC .10 or abo\">).
the primary criterion for inclusion.

This was

Seven respondents were also cited

for one additional alcohol-related traffic-offense such as minor
possession or open container, with another seven indicating having been
cited for at least two similar offenses.

Table 2 indicates respondents’

reported offense cross-tabulated by gender.
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'able 2

Reported Offense by Gender

DU I

APC

Minor in
Possession

Open
Container

Other

Total

Males

77

6

1

0

3

87

Females

14

0

0

0

0

14

91

6

1

0

3

101

Total

Frequency missing = 3

Participants ranged in age from 17 to 73 with the majority
clustered in the 20- 24 y^ar •old age group.

The mean age for the entire

population was 29.10 years, with males and females averaging 29.03 and
29.77 years. respect ively.

Table 3 is a cross -tabulation of age -ranges

by gender.
Table 3

Are of Respondents by Gender

36-40

41-50

51-60

61-70

71+

Total

14

5

3

7

0

1

83

4

4

1

1

0

0

0

14

12

18

6

4

7

0

1

97

21-23

26-30

17

28

8

Females 2

1

29

<20
Males

Total

19

Frequency missing —

31-35
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As the primary means of determining blood alcohol levels (BAC) of
suspected impaired drivers, blood samples are taken at a local hospital
and sent to the North Dakota State Toxicology Department located on the
North Dakota State University campus.

For the entire population, the

average BAC was .1701, with males averaging .1673 and females averaging
.1883.

It should be noted, however, that because 12 of the male

participants were not cited for DUI, their BAC levels were most probably
less than the legally prescribed minimum of

to.

Table 4 shows the

cross -tabulation of BAC levels by gender.

Table 4

Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) by Gender
.05- .10

.11- .15

.16-.20

.21-.25

.25+

Males

4

28

31

15

1

79

Females

0

3

5

a

0

12

Total

4

31

36

19

1

91

Total

Frequency missing - 13

Methods of Analysis

With a series of attitudinal items, respondents were asked to
indicate their agreement/disagreement .with statement'.- Identifying the
severity of various informally-enforced sanctions following their
conviction for DUI.

Items depicting various informal channels such as

family, colleagues, and friends were used to represent the construct of
informal sanctions.

A similar construct was initially proposed to

35
represent respondents' perceptions of formal sanctions; however, after
considerable theoretical contemplation, such an effort was discouraged.
Since formal sanctions are most often associated directly with legal
sanctions (i.e., fines, loss of license, etc.), it was decided that
severity of perceptions regarding these would be little more than a
function of access to available resources (i.e., money, legal counsel,

etc.).
As a preliminary tool designed to filter out and group together
existing underlying relationships, an exploratory factor analysis
technique was utilized on the 26 items dealing with sanctions.

This

technique maintains a common objective of representing a set of
variables in terms of a smaller number of hypothetical variables (i.e.,
informal sanctions).

In an exploratory application as used here, factor

analysis is an expedient way of ascertaining the minimum number of
hypothetical factors that can account for the observed covariation, and
as a means of exploring the data for possible data reduction (Kim and
Mueller 1986. p. 9).
After applying this technique to the 26 items dealing with
individual sanctioning, a-scale was constructed utilizing 13 of these
items.

SPSS-X (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) was used

for all analyses.

Cronbach's alpha was used a measure of reliability.

The independent variable of social status was constructed using
modification of Tittle's (1980) larger five-category additive index of
status.

Unskilled workers such as laborers were coded as one (1),

skilled laborers such as welders were assigned a two (2), and
professional/managerial persons were assigned a three (3).
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The 12-item income scale was developed using similar values,
beginning with a one (1) for the $0-$4,999 category and continuing
upward to the $50,000 or above category, which was assigned an eleven
(11).

Lastly, the variable of education was accordingly given similar

values, ranging from a one (1) for having completed grades 1-8 and a
five (5) for a college graduate or higher.

From the consequent

summation of these three variables, a scale ranging from 3-19 was
constructed utilizing the three social status indicators of occupation,
income, and education.
Hcfwever, it should be cautioned that each respective status
represents a combination of three characteristics.

Thus, a low

education could be more than offset by a larger than expected income
(i.e., skilled laborers).

Likewise, a larger educational value (5)

could be offset by a smaller income than expected (i.e., university
professors).

As a precautionary measure to avoid any unusual

distributions, these scale items formulated to represent social status
were also analyzed separately to account for individual impacts.

Da ta Limitations

Obviously, no data collection technique is without limitations.
A number of obvious limitations are evident within this data set,
many of which are simply functions of survey research techniques and the
sensitive nature of the research.

While self-reported data has long

been criticized as inaccurate or insufficient, most criticisms addressed
are simply unavoidable under the circumstances and accepted for lack of
a better technique.
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Particularly when dealing with socially sensitive topical areas
such as deviant behavior, respondents are often compelled to
inaccurately report past behavior or present attitudes despite
guaranteed anonymity.
bias was involved.

Undoubtedly, some socially-desirable response

Also, when respondents were asked items concerning

informal sanctions, it can be assumed that some respondents are simply
not as perceptive to these forces as others, regardless of whether or
not they (informal sanctions) indeed exist.
Another potential barrier to honest, uncontaminated responses is
the fact that completion of the questionnaire was most likely viewed as
a mandatory part of the program.

While it was adopted by the program

staff as an official portion of the program, mandatory completion of the
instrument was not stressed.

Nevertheless, this implied consent may

have compelled some respondents to indicate either socialy desirable
answers or to simply complete the questionnaire as quickly as possible
with little regard to question content.
Certainly, another issue is one of generalizability, or predicitive
validity.

That is, whether or not the 104 respondents surveyed during
*

the Cass County First Offender Programs constitute a representative
cross-sanple of DUI offenders.

Obviously, as the program's name

implies, the more extreme cases of DUI such as multiple offenders would
most likely be channeled to either inpatient or outpatient chemical
dependency treatment.

Those offenders exhibiting extremely high BAC

levels at the time of arrest are also likley to follow a similar fate,
drastically underestimating the average BAC level of those within the
sample.
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Another potential biasing agent is one of police apprehension.

One

can assume those arrested for DUI constitute a random cross-sample who
were simply unfortunate enough to be caught and arrested.

Only if this

assumption is correct can one further assume that this program cross sample is similarly representative, that their attendance in the program
is not the result of some underlying bias.

This issue, while

unexplored, is nevertheless a viable concern.
Going a step further, those convicted of DUI may be filtered out by
means other than a police apprehension bias.

For instance, DUI has

proven to be such a "dependable" and consistent violation that
specialized legal counsel now exists which does little more than defend
DUI* cases.

Lawyers who specialize in beating DUIs in court attest to

the perceived social seriousness of the offense.

Not surprisingly,

then, those with greatest access to the necessary resources (^.e.,
money, etc.) are most able to resort to legal means to avoid a DUI
conviction.

The distribution is thus greatly skewed away from higher

income violators, a phenomenon characteristic of other criminal
violations as well.
Lastly, a certain number of questionnaires (about 24 percent) were
either not completed, contained numerous uncompleted items, or were
completed by respondents participating in the program for violation(s)
other than DUI.

.Because of this relatively small sample, the decision

was made to include respondents' informal sanction scale score if 11 of
the.13 items (85 percent) were completed.

Missing scores were replaced

by means scores tabulated from a summation of existing responses.

It

was felt this would be a more accurate representation of the sample;
population than would excluding them by a listwise deletion process.
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Dependent Variable

Individual perceptions of informal sanctions is the dependent
variable of this study.

In developing this construct, it was attempted

to adequately represent all primary domains of what constitutes informal
sanctioning.

Encompassing a considerably more dynamic and individual

nature than formalized santions, items reflecting the reactions of
various significant others such as family, co-workers, and friends were
utilized..

However, it should again be noted that recognition of

informal sanctioning depends largely upon the perceptiveness of the
respondent.

That is, simply because a subject is unaware of the

sanction does not necessarily imply that none exists.
In an attempt to uncover the underlying structure of correlation,
factor analysis was performed as a means of partitioning out unrelated
data.

A principal components extraction technique with a varimax

rotation was used, with a .40 factor loading established as a minimum
criterion for item inclusion into the respective factors.
When all items dealing with individual reactions to DUI (Z1-Z26)
were incorporated into a factor analysis technique, 10 factors were
extracted.

In a confirmatory mode, however, the factor analysis

technique extracted four factors when applied only to certain scale
items.
Factor one represents a 'collection of informally-enforced
sanctioning items concerning their severity in relation to formal
sanctions.
factor are:

The 5 items (see Appendix A) which compx'ise this first
Z6, Z12, Z13, Z19, and Z22.

For identification of these
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particular items, please refer to Appendix A.
The second factor represents similar informally-enforced
sanctioning items reflecting a negative perception of the offender by
the public in general.

Included in this factor are items:

Z14, Z18,

and Z24 (see Appendix A).
Factor three represents informally-enforced sanctions which reflect
a negative perception within the offender's work environment.
in this factor are items:

Included

Z10, Zll, and Z24.

The final factor represents family-oriented informal sanctions.
This factor is comprised of items:

Zl, Z 6 , and Z16.

It should be

noted, however, that while a general rule of thumb concerning factor
analysis is to use only those factors which exhibit significant loadings
on at least three variables, a similar rule states that, reglardless of
the number of significant variables

only those factors which can be

reasonably interpreted should be utilized.

Factor Analysis Interpretation

While this research has attempted to identify the underlying
factors, the factorial complexity of the final two variables must be
addressed.

The factorial complexity refers to the number of factors

having (significant) loadings on a given variable (Kim and Mueller 1986,
p. 24).

In this case, only variables within the first two factors load

on a single common factor, giving them a factorial complexity of one.
The third factor loads upon two unique variables (Z10 and Zll), but also
on Z24.

Likewise, factor four exhibits similar loadings on Zl and Z16

while sharing a significant loading with Z 6 .

In each case, the

41
secondary factor loading is lower than it's initial loading.
In some instances, the lower of the two (or multiple) factor
loadings are simply dropped from the analysis.

With the last two

factors maintaining the methodologically prescribed minimum of variables
comprising the factor, such an exclusion would most certainly prove
detrimental to complete representation of the construct of informal
sanctions.

On the other hand, the consistency with which the variables

group within the last three factors should be more closely examined.
Within factor two, the three items identified concern the
embarassment of getting caught, the fear of having one's name appear in
the local newspaper, and the fear of being labeled an alcoholic.

In

each case, the item reflects the offender's fear of negative public
reaction.

These three items, while being exclusive to factor two, also

appear to have the common denominator of fear of public exposure.
Factor three is less concrete.

The first two items concern the

offenders' relationships at work and his/her obligation to setting a
good example at home/work.

These have been interpreted to be one of the

established primary ties which channel informal sanctions to the
offender (co-workers, colleagues, etc).

As much as they represent a

certain primary tie, however, they also represent a certain reaction by
the offender concerning that social tie:

that of a perceived loss of

status among previously-established subordinates in work and/or
family settings.

Looking to the third item which loads significantly on

factor three sheds light on this interpretation.

Item Z24 deals with

the perception of people labeling the offender a drunk or an alcoholic.
Since the origin of the effect is unspecified, it must be assumed that
this item relies upon the perceived loss of status among significant
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others in general.

With this item interpreted as such, the third factor

seems adequately interpretable.
Factor four is similar in nature.

While the first two items which

load significantly are related in nature, the third item is of a more
generic (but explainable) content.

Items Z1 and Z16 entail the

perceived reaction of the offender's family with regard to his/her DUI.
Item Z6 simply states the perceived reaction of "others" to the
individual's offense.

If this designation of "others" can be assumed to

encompass the foremost primary tie of the family, then factor four can
also be utilized as being interpretable.
Although the possibility of collapsing the informal sanctioning
scale into groups of equal intervals was contemplated, an examination of
the distribution of the data revealed a strong clustering effect near
the midway point, with those numbers falling off drastically at the
upper extreme of the scale.

At the risk of deleting those few scores

which occupy.the high end of the scaling distribution, the decision was
made to retain the scale scores as continuous interval-level variables.

Independent Variables

Social Status
The construct of social status is one of the primary independent
variables in this study.

Using Tittle's (1'280) construct of social

status, the variables of occupation, education, and income were
incorporated into a single variable.

While each of these three

variables were combined as unweighted measures, analysis was also
conducted using each individual variable in it's original state.
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Occupation
The variable of occupation initially consisted of assigning an
individual code to every discernible occupation listed.

For the purpose

of data reduction and clarification, the occupations were collapsed into
three distinct categories:

1) unskilled labor, which consists of

occupations requiring no formalized training;

2) skilled labor, which

consists of occupations requiring some formalized training,
apprenticeship, or completion of a degree; and 3)
professional/managerial, which consists of upper-level occupations such
as supervisor, foreman, or owner.

The duties prescribed within this

latter category involve the direct supervision of subordinates.

Income
Income is defined within an 11-level Likert scale beginning at $0$4,999 and increasing in approximately $5,000 intervals (see Appendix
A).

It should be noted that this is net income, or the total spendable

income available after taxes.

Income is collapsed into the five

categories of:

2) $15-24,999

$44,999

and

1) $0-14,999;

5) $45,000 and over.

3) $25-$34,999

4) $35-

Mean breakdowns and cross

tabulations are performed using these categorical designations, with the
original variable coded from 1 to 11 used in the summated scale of
social status.

Education
Education, is a 5-level Likert scale beginning with completion of
grade 1 through 8 and ending with college graduate or more (see Appendix
A).

Cross -tabulation and mean breakdowns are utilized to plot any

44
observable trends, with education also used to formulate the variable of
social status.

Gender
The gender of the respondent is a nominally-measured variable coded
simply 1 for males and 2 for females (see Appendix A).

Because of it's

nominal nature, regression analysis utilizing dummy or effect coding is
the only alternative to incorporating this variable into a regression
equation..

A more appropriate technique would simply be a difference of

means test across sexes.

Length of Residence
Length of residence in a community is utilized as a measure of
primary ties to the community.

Initially, respondents were asked to

indicate how long they had lived within their current community of
residence (see Appendix A).

To aid in the analysis, this variable was

computed into total months rather than years, due to the fact that not
all respondents had lived at their current address longer than one year.
Length of residency was also collapsed into the categories of:
than 12 months;

2) 12-60 months;

5) 241-360 months:

3) 61-120 months;

6) 361-480 months;

1) less

4) 121-240 months;

and 7) 481-600 months.

No

respondent reported living within their current community for longer
than 50 years (600 months).

Marital Status
Marital status was reported as:
married

3) divorced;

4) seperated;

1) single, never married;

2)

or 5) widowed (see Appendix A).
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Since measurement of this variable is restricted to an ordinal level, it
will be used as an independent criterion to breakdown informal
sanctioning scale scores.

Size of Current Community of Residence
Using a six-tiered designation of community size beginning with
farm and progressing through metropolitan (100.000+), respondent's
community of residence size will undergo an univariate analysis similar
to the previous ordianally-measured variables (see Appendix A ) .

Preview of Findings

With the review and description of the previous variables to be
utilized in the analysis, the following chapter will summarize the
findings as they relate to the previously specified hypotheses.

The

final chapter will relate the future impacts of these findings upon
related research as well as potential policy implications.

Chapter IV

FINDINGS

The construct of perceived severity of informal sanctions was
created as the dependent variable of this study.

Comprised of 13

Likert-type items which asked convicted DUI offenders how they perceived
reactions of others toward them, a scale was developed which
.approximates this construct.
Having selected items thought to be representative of a shared
construct (informal sanctioning), a confirmatory factor analysis was run
which yielded four factors identified as 1) informal versus formal
sanctions:

2) informal sanctions transmitted via the public;

3)

informal sanctions transmitted via co-workers/colleagucs; and

4)

informal sanctions channeled via respondent's immediate family.
To test these 13 items as they contribut to the overall reliability
of the scale, Cronbach’s alpha was used.^

Using the reliability

function of SPSS-X (SPSS 1986), an alpha of ,81.23 was obtained (See
Appendix B ) .

Although it is difficult to specify what level is

acceptable in all situations, it is believed that reliabilities should
not be below .80 for widely used scales (Carmines and Zeller 1987, p.
51).

In addition, in most situations, alpha provides a conservative

1
Defined as a measure of internal consistency, Cronbach's alpha is
calculated using the mean interitem correlation divided by the number of
scale items (Carmines and Zeller 1979, p. 44).

estimate of a measure's reliability (Carmines and Zeller 1987, p. 45).
It would seem, therefore, that the reliability of this newly-constructed
scale is such that each of the 13 items appear to be consistently
measuring the same construct.
•
As an exploratory technique for observing the strength and
,

diversity of the relationships among the variables of interest, a
Pearson's R measure of association was performed using the Pearson
correlation command of SPSS-X.^

This statistic is useful in both an

exploratory and confirmatory mode of data analysis, although the
correlation coefficients are themselves devoid of any causal
interpretations.
For binomial variables, the T-test procedure was used as a
difference of means test for scale scores.J

In cases where variables

under scrutinization consisted of more than two groups, the oneway
procedure was used as a difference of means test for multiple groups/4
The Scheffe's Test statistic utilizing an alpha of .10 was prescribed to
aid in the comparison of significance levels among several groups.-3

2
The Pearson correlation command of SPSS-X produces matrices of
Pearson product-moment correlations with significance levels and number
of cases (SPSS 1986, p. 639).
J The T-test procedure compares the sample means (informal sanction
scale scores) by calculating Student's t and the test of significance of
the difference between means (SPSS 1986, p. 443).
^ The oneway procedure produces a oneway analysis of variance for
an interval level variable (informal sanction scale scores) by one
independent variable (SPSS 1986, p. ’465).
J Although social scientists conventionally set alpha at .05 or,
somewhat less frequently, .10 or .01, the researcher has th<
responsibility of selecting an alpha level that seems most ;•asonable in
terms of the goals of the research project (Healey 1984, p. 143).
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Due to the exploratory nature and the virtual unestablishment of the
independent construct (informal sanctions) within the discipline, an
alpha of .10 was prescribed.
A multiple regression technique was considered as a means of
transforming previously established statistical relationships into a
theoretically-driven causal model.

In such a model, the attempt would

be made to determine how induced variations in the independent variable
lead to variations in the dependent variable (perceived severity of
informal sanctions).

Stated differently, the goal is to determine how,

and to what extent, does variability in the dependent variable depend
upon manipulations of the independent variable (Pedhazur 1982, p. 15).
However, the decision was made to avoid a regression analysis based
on several statistical and theoretical considerations.

First and

foremost, the levels of measurement of the relevant independent
variables (nominal and ordinal) do not justly suit
regression analysis.

Admittedly, whi1> the treat

variables as interval within regression analyses i

• •t'selves to a
of ordinal-level
not uncommon,

subsequent interpretation of the beta coefficients is characterized as
cautious at best.

Additionally, although the binomial variable of

gender would lend itself to a regression analysis via dummy or effect
coding, such an analysis would yield little more than a difference of
means test.
Scjondly, despite the a priori statement of hypotheses, the nature
of this study is more exploratory than confirmatory.

The primary

relevance of this study will be the future hypotheses-generating effects
of the findings.

As such, the relationships between the variables

predicted in Chapter Two are of more a correlational than a causal
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order.

Any interaction effects or causal modeling should be undertaken

:.n similar studies of greater scope, implementing a more defined measure
of informal sanctions as well as more intricate measurement techniques.
Thirdly, and perhaps secondarily, the usage of exploratory
techniques during the preliminary analysis stage indicated little
justification to continuing on to more intricate statistical methods.
Had the correlations and the difference of means tests indicated highly
significant findings, progression to a causal technique would probably
have been warranted.

Based on these preliminary findings, however, it

was determined that no need for multivariate analysis existed.

Sfig-Xal S.v.v«m5.Rgia.
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The previously stated hypothesis concerning social status and
informal sanctions suggests that persons of higher social status will
tend to perceive informally-enforced sanctions as more severe than will
persons of lower statuses.

Using a derivation of Tittle's (1980)

construct of social status, the variables of education, income, and
occupation were formulated to comprise an additive summarization of
status.

For this transformation, the variable of occupation was first

collapsed into the three categories of:
labor; and

1) unskilled labor;

2) skilled

3) professional/managerial.

The social status variable encompassed a possible range of scores
from 3 to 19.

A frequency distribution of the actual scores showed a

normal distribution with a range from 3 to 16, with the higher values
representing a higher social status.

To render the data in a usable

form to perform a oneway analysis of variance, social status was
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collapsed into three categories:
to 6 (N=27);

1) Low social status = values from 3

2) Medium social status — values from 7 to 10 (N=50);

and

3) High social status = values from 11 to 16 (N=24).
Preliminary analysis using the Pearson's R correlation coefficient
indicates a virtually non-existant relationship (R = -.0004, P — .498)
between the three constructed status groups and each respondent's scale
score measuring perceived severity of informal sanctions.
Interestingly, the correlation of respondent's social status as a
contiguous variable (prior to formation of the three groups) is somewhat
stronger, although still highly non-significant (R -> - .0643, P «• .261).
The oneway procedure comparing the mean values of informal sanction
scale scores across social status groups (See Table 5) yielded an
equally non-significant finding (F — .6192, P « .5405), which confirms
the apparent accuracy of the slight correlation. The breakdown of mean
scale scores by social status group yielded a total variance range of
less than 1.8.

Table 5
Onewav Analysis of Variance of Social Status and
Perception of Severity of Informal Sanctions

Source
Between
Vi th in
Total

Mean
Sauares

Degrees of
Freedom

Sum of
Sauares

2

70.0984

35.0492

98

5547.2680

56.6048

100

5617.3663

F
Ratio
.6192

F
Probabilitv
.5405
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Social Status Elaborated

A primary concern indicated earlier was the threat to validity the
unweighted measures of income, education, and occupation might
potentially pose.

That is, how a disproportionately high education

level combined with a high occupational status might be cancelled out by
a lower than expected income (i.e., university professors).

Because the

construct of social status is in and of itself highly dynamic and
contested, "appropriate" weightings would likely be a matter of debate
has they in fact been applied to adjust the respective variable values.
At any rate, despite their undisputed statistical insignificance as a
collective construct, the individual variables comprising social status
may constitute formidable factors in identifying the variance of scale
scores.

Income
Along with occupation and education, the variable of income was
incorporated into the construct of social status.

The Pearson's R

correlation coefficient, however, indicates not only an insignificant
relationship between respondents' income levels and perception of
informal sanctions (R = -.0702, P — .252), but a negative relationship
as well.
Initially, the income variable was coded from 1 to 11, with each
category ascending in approximatley $5,000 increments.

Because persons

in the upper-level income brackets are largely underrepresented in the
DUI statistics, income was collapsed into four groups to partially
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alleviate the small numbers which would occupy these higher income
categories.

The four groups consist of:

2) $15,000-29,999 (N - 33);

1) $14,999 and less (N = 44);

3) $30,000-39,999 (N - 11);

and 4) $40,000

and greater (N = 5).
As illustrated by Table 6, the oneway analysis of variance
indicates a statistically insignificant finding (F = 2.13, P
although barely so.

.1019),

While this ratio is insignificant at a confidence

level prescribed by most in the social sciences (.05), such a finding
should be sufficient to warrant future exploration into the
relationship.

This researcher cautiously interprets the strength of

this relationship to be one of moderate intensity at a conservatively
acceptable confidence level.

Nonetheless, the primary crux of this

finding should be the realization that enough of a relationship appears
to exist to warrant further exploration into the phenomenon.

Table 6
Onewav Analvsis of Variance of Income and
Perception of Severity of Informal Sanctions
Degrees of
Freedom

Sum of
Sauares

3

Within
Total

Source
Between

Mean
Sauares

F
Ratio

311.5940

103.8647

2.1311

89

4337.6318

48.7374

92

4649.2258

F
Probabi
.1019

Occupation
In representing occupational status, the variable representing
respondent's occupation was collapsed into categories based upon jobrelated training requirements and supervisory capacity.

The following
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categories consisted of:

1.) unskilled labor (N = 29);

2.) skilled

labor (N — 27);' and 3.) professional\managerial (N — 15).
As an preliminary exploratory technique, the Pearson's R
correlation coefficient indicated only a moderate loading (P = .2672),
but with a highly respectable one-tailed significance level (P — .012).
Interestingly, occupation appears to have little relationship with
income (R = -.0600, P = .315), indicating that many less sociallyprestigious jobs result in higher wages than expected and vice verse, or
that those household incomes which are unexpectedly high in relation to
occupational status are the result of second incomes.
Utilizing these three occupational status groups, a oneway analysis
of variance was performed with the informal sanction scale serving as
the dependent variable (See Table 7).

The oneway procedure calculated

an F value of 2.61 at an .08 level of significance.

In addition, the

Scheffe's Test procedure recognized a significant difference (Alpha .10) in group means between Group 1 (unskilled laborers) and Group 3
(professional/managerial workers).

As hypothesized, the group means

were lowest (indicating a low perceived severity of informal sanctions)
among those lowest in occupational status and highest (indicating a high
perceived severity of informal sanctions) among those highest in
occupational status.
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Table 7
Oneway Analysis of Variance of Occupational Status and
Perception of Severity of Informal Sanctions
Degrees of
Freedom

Source

Sum of
Sauares

Mean
Sauares

F
Ratio
2.6149

2

271.4498

135.7249

Within

68

3529.5361

51.9049

Total

70

3800.9859

Between

F
Probability
.0805

Education
Since the education variable consists of only 5 categories,
collapsing it into broader categories would be of little benefit.

In

examination of education's correlational relationship to occupation and
income, both coefficients are of low intensity and high probability
levels,

(R - .0312, P - .400) and (R - .0684, P - .257), respectively.

Educati >n, is appears, is a poor predictor of a l'espondent's
occupational status group or his/her household income level.
A oneway analysis of variance was also calculated using the five
ranges of respondent's educational level as the independent variable and
the informal sanction scale as the dependent variable (See Table 8).
Not surprisingly, the test resulted in a small F ratio with an equally
low level of significance (F — .8733, P — .4832).

Despite the virtual

lack of variance among mean scale scores for the five educational
groups, the average for those with less than an 8th gracfe education is
considerably higher than those possessing a college degree.

Of course,

the number of respondents falling into both of these educational
categories is sufficiently small to render these variations little more
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than statistical aberrations.

Thus, educational attainment, in and of

itself as well as in contribution to the social status construct,
appears to be an insignificant variable in the perceived severity of
informal sanctions related to DUI.

Table 8
Oneway Analysis of Variance of Educational Level and
Perception of Severity of Informal Sanctions
Degrees of
Sum of
Mean
Source________ Freedom______ Squares______ Squares

F
Ratio

Between

.8733

4

177.0891

44.2723

Within

92

4664.0037

50.6957

Total

96

4841.0928

F
Probability
.4832

Gender

The relationship between gender and perceived severity of informal
DUI-related sanctions is hypothesized to be one as it relates directly
to the notion of deviant behavior.

That is, while deviant behavior is

ideally consistently sanctioned by various social forces, it is more so
for certain members of society.

Various studies have established

sentencing and fine discrepancies (formal sanctions) based along racial,
ethnic, and gender lines.

If it is. true that, in certain instances,

females ar'e more severely formally sanctioned than are males, this
variation should be expected to prevalent in the informal sanctioning
process as well.
The Pearson's R correlation coefficient for sex and perceived
severity of informal sanctions is less than moderate but statistically
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significant (R — .2090, P — .018).

'when incorporated into a T-Test

method of analyzing mean differences between dichotomous groups, a
Student's t value of -1.64 at a two-tailed probability level of .121 was
obtained using seperate variance estimates (See Table 9).

Although the

pooled variance estimates are considerably more respectable (t — -2.11,
P — .037), they are an inaccurate indicator due to the large discrepancy
in the population variance caused by the difference in respective sample
sizes.

As stated by Healey (1984, p. 160), the assumption of equal

variance in the population can be considered justified as long as sample
sizes are approximately equal.

Given this assumption that both

populations are normal, the additional assumptions of equal means and
equal standard deviations amount to postulating that the two populations
are equal (Blalock 1979, p. 227).
Since the two sample variances will ordinarily be based on
different numbers of cases, an estimate of the common variance can be
obtained by taking a weighted average of the sample variances, being
careful to divide by the proper degrees of freedom in order to obtain an
unbiased estimated (Blalock 1979, p. 228-229).
However, if normal populations are assumed, the normal computation
of Student's t scores is somewhat questionable in instances where the
sample sizes are not too large (approximately less than 50) or where the
sample sizes are very different.

Concerning this problem, Blalock

(1979, p. 231) r'ecognizes that the difficulty in computation of
Student's t scores between samples of different sizes arises in proper
selection of the degrees of freedom.

This is true because if the

respective population variances do not differ greatly, the relative
sizes of the two fractions within the calculation will be determined

57
primarily by their denominators (Blalock 1979).
When sample sizes are such that it is impossible to assume that the
two populations have the same standard deviations, it is also impossible
to introduce an accurate value to the common population variance and
thus form a pooled variance estimate.

In this specific case of males

and females, the problem is two-fold in that the population for females
is relatively low (N = 14) and the difference between the two samples is
relatively high.
To alleviate this dilemma, Blalock (1979) offers an alternative
formula for computing t scores, although there is nothing in this
modified procedure which requires that the standard deviations be
unequal.

If the respective standard deviations are close to being

equal, this method will simply be less efficient because of it's
approximations of the degrees of freedom.
However, despite this identifiable distinction, Blalock (1979, p.
231) also states that the two methods will usually yield similar results
if the standard deviations are in fact equal, since both sample standard
deviations will ordinarily be good estimates of the common population
variance.
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Table 9
Student's t Score for Males and Females
of Perception of Severity of Informal Sanctions

Group

N

Males

86

Females

14

Standard
Deviation

Standard
Error

33.2791

6.950

0.749

37.7857

9.870

2.638

Mean

Variance Estimates
T
Value

Degrees of
Freedom

Pooled Variance Est.

-2.11

98

Separate Variance Est.

-1.64

15.17

2-Tail
Probability
0.037
0.121

One solution to this problem is to weight accordingly each female
respondent to decrease the standard deviation by increasing the sample
size.

However, although this method would decrease the population

variance between males and females without altering the their respective
population mean, such a technique is discouraged by some statisticians
because it artificially inflates sample sizes through no other discourse
other than researcher manipulations.
Since it has been hypothesized that females will rate significantly
higher on their respective scale scores than will males, a directional
hypothesis has been stated a priori.

Thus, the probability for a one-

tailed test is raised to a slightly more

confident interval (.0555).

One's gender, in fact, appears to be a moderately significant factor in
the perception of severity of informal sanctions.

And, as hypothesized,
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females are more likely to perceive this severity as greater than are
males.
Primary Ties

The basic notion of primary ties and their effect on enforcing
conformist behavior comes from the work on delinquency of social control
theorists, primarily Travis Hirschi.

The underlying premise of this

theory suggests that an individual's bond to society is the primary
factor affecting conformist and deviant behavior (Hirschi, 1969).

With

this being the case, one would expect those more socially integrated to
be more suceptible to perceiving informal sanctioning as severe than
would those lacking the primary social bonds imperative to the
enforcement of normative behavior.
To examine the validity of this theoretical assumption, four
different but related variables will be utilized in the analyses.
Firstly, the social domain of the family will be addressed, using the
marital status and example -setting roles of the DUI offenders.

This

latter variable asks respondents whether or not they share their current
(
residence with anyone under the age of 18.
The other analysis utilizes the domain of ties to the community.
For this, length of residence (in months) and size of community or
residence are analyzed seperately.

Integration into a community is

hypothesized to be a formidable factor in the enforcement of conformist
behavior, and communities smaller in size would be expected to yield a
more static, cohesive social integration of the offender into the
immediate social sub-structure.
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Marital Status
As a variable, marital status is comprised of a five-category
response:

1) single, never married (N = 57);

separated (N = 3);

2) married (N = 26);

4) divorced (N = 13); and 5) widowed (N — 1).

3)
As a

primary tie establishing one to the enforcement of societal norms
through a higher level of social integration, the bonding effects of
marriage and family should impact considerably the perception of
severity of informal sanctions.
The Pearson's R statistic indicates only a weak correlation between
a respondent's marital status and their perception of severity of
informal sanctions (R - .0854, P - .198).

As one might then expect, a

oneway analysis of variance calculated a uncontestedly low F value of
.6211 with an F probability of .6486 (See Table 10).

One's marital

status, as it represents an anchor for social bonding, has no
statistically significant distinguishing feature on the severity of
perceptions of informal sanctions.

Table 10
Onewav Analvsis of Variance of Marital Status and
Perception of Severity of Informal Sanction
Degrees of
Freedom

Sum of
Squares

4

142.8063

35.7016

Within

95

5461.0337

57.4846

Tota 1

99

5603.8400

Source
Between

Mean
Squares

F
Ratio

F
Probabi

.6211

.6486
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However, although it exists without statistical significance, one
curious deviation in the mean scores across marital status groups is
apparent (See Table 11).

The highest .mean score (36.69) is among those

respondents reporting a marital status of divorced, indicating that
detection of their offense may result in some unknown but apparently
serious perceived informal sanction.

Further analysis reveals that when

asked, "who was the first person you worried about finding out about
your DUI?” , 30.0 percent of the divorced group indicated their children
while 20.0 percent reported their ex-spouse.

Nonetheless, it appears as

if simple marital status does not constitute any consistent statistical
trend as it relates to perception of severity of informal sanctioning.

Table 11

Informal Sanctions bv Marital Status
Standard
Deviation

Standard
Error

N

Mean

Single

57

33.9825

7.0140

.9290

Married

26

33.2308

7.4313

1.4574

3

32.3333

5.6862

3.2830

13

36.6923

10.2501

2.8429

1

29.0000

Group

Separated
Divorced
Widowed

Ex amp1e -Se 11 ing Roles
A considerable social responsibility in the role of parents and
older family member;
setting.

.like is the influence exerted through example -

Particularly children at an age where societal development and

critical initiation to norms takes place, a primary family figure may
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feel a sense of failure or humiliation of his/her role due to their
conviction for DUI.

However, depending on the 3ge of the children,

knowledge and/or realization of the consequences of DUI may not be
readily recognized.

Nonetheless, it can be argued that the financial

sacrifice made through the fine as well as the loss of license could
result in a perceived careless sacrifice of resources intended to
benefit the entire family, children included.
Respondents wtre asked. "How many family members (brothers,
sisters, children etc.) under the age of 18 currently live with you?".
To aid in the analysis and to gain a more representative number of
respondents within each category, the number of family members indicated
was simply collapsed into the following two categoreis:

1.) children

under 18 currently living with you (N - 32); and 2.) no children under
18 currently living with you (N - 69),
The Pearson's R coefficient reveals little correlational
relationship between the two groups coded above and the perceived
severity of informal sanctioning (R - -.0137, P - .447).

Furthermore,

the T-Test procedure also indicated a non-significant finding with a
calculated t value of -.90 with Alpha — .165 (See Table 12).

However,

those indicating the presence of family members under the age of 18
living within their residence did as a group tend to score higher in
terms of perceived severity of informal sanctions, 34.96 compared to
33.5? for those with no such younger family members.
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Table 12
Student's t Test of Respondents Living With
Children Under 18 for Perception
_____ of Severity of Informal Sanctions_____

Group

N

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Standard
Error

Yes

32

33.5286

6.792

0.812

No

70

34.9688

8.844

1.563

Variance Estimates
T
Value

Degrees of
Freedom

2-Tail
Probability

Pooled Variance Est.

-0.90

100

0.370

Separate Variance Est.

-0.82

48.39

0.418

Although the presence and absence of this variable has been shown
to be of little statistical significance regarding the informal sanction
scores, further analysis into the matter may prove more revealing in
terms of theoretical foresight.

Once again when asked, "Who was the

first person you worried about finding out about your DUI?", 44.4
percent of those having no family members currently residing with them
indicated some immediate family member, with 7.9 percent specifying
their spouse.
Those with at least one family member under the age of 18 currently
residing with them also placed their immediate family at the top of
their responses of those most fearful of finding out about their DUI.
Of these, a slightly higher percentage (48.2%) indicated an immediate
family member, with almost twice as large a proportion (13.8) directly
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specifying their spouse.

While difficult to establish any statistical

significance in these percentages given the small sample size and varied
responses, the seemingly substantial increase in the porportion of
respondents living in the presence of adolescent family members who
specified their spouse as the first person they feared finding out about
their DUI is an interesting segmentation.

Marital Status/Example-Settine Roles
Even though the presence of two individual variables may appear
to have little interaction with the dependent variable under
scrutinization, the combination of the effects into a single variable
sometimes yields different results.

As indicated in the previous two

analyses, marital status was hypothesized to be a significant factor in
the perception of severity of informal sanctions.

Relatedly, immediate

family members residing within the respndent’s current household was
used to represent the presence of a socially-defined "example -setting"
role of the respondent.
A variable was created which combined the presence/absence of these
two characterictics.

Firstly, those respondents who were not married

(single, separated, divorced, widowed) were assigned a single value,
with those indicating a married status left as a single value.

The

variable used in the previous analysis, presence/absence of immediate
family members under the age if 18, was not altered.
The new variable was segmented into four groups:

1) those not

married with nc> immediate family members under the age of 18 currently
residing within their household (N = 47);

2) those not married but

indicating at least one immediate family member under the age of 18
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currently residing within their household (N = 11);

3) those married

with no immediate family members under the age of 18 currently residing
within their household (N — 12); and 4)

those married with ah least one

immediate family member under the age of 18 currently residing within
their household (N — 14).
A preliminary mean breakdown of scale scores among the four groups
indicates little variation save Group 3, those who are married but
indicate no presence of family members under 18 (See Table 13).
Surprisingly, however, their mean score of 31.58 is noticeably lower
than the mean (34.03) of their counterparts in Group 1, (those not
married and without immediate family members under 18 living within
their household).

Of course, when contrasted to Group 4 on the basis of

their marital status, the difference in means scores is in a direction
we would theoretically expect.

That is, that the presence of immediate

family members under the age of 18 appears to have a noticeable affect
on the perception of severity of informal sanctions, hypothesized in
this study to be sanctioning due primarily to a failed role of an
example-setter within the family context.

In support of this hypothesis

is the group frequencies Of all DUI offenders within the sample outlined
in the above paragraph, with 56.4 percent of all respondents occupying
Group 1 status (unmarried and without immediate family under 18
currently residing within the same household).
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Table 13
Mean Breakdown of Perception of Severity of
Informal Sanctions bv
____ Marital Status/Example-Setting Role____

N

Group

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Group 1

56

34.0357

6.7608

Group 2

18

35.2222

9.9028

Group 3

12

31.5833

7.1663

Group 4

14

34.6429

7.6219

Conventional Ties/Social Integration

Length of Residence
How well a person is integrated into the community's social
structure depends upon many pertinent factors, many of which are less
societal characteristics as social-psychological characteristics of the
individual.

While length of residence within a certain community

environment is not necessarily synonymous with social bonding or
cohesion, it makes sense theoretically that longer residences should
play a distinguishing factor in terms of perceived severity of informal
sanctions.

The reverse is also true, that those having shorter

residency periods have not had adequate time to integrate themselves
into the existing social structure, complete with the informal
sanctioning channels established via the medium of various significant
others.
The variable which measured length of residency of respondent's
current place of residence was an open ended question recorded in either
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years or months.

This latter category was added due to the expected

number of college students who reside within the immediate
geographic sample environment, many of which are not year-around
residents.

A variable was then computed which transformed the raw

scores into a total of months, which ranged from 2 months to 50 years
(600 months).
In examining the correlations of length of residency of the
respondent's current community of residence, a moderate negative
relationship (R = -.2644, P - .004) exists between length of residence
and whether or not anyone in the respondent's immediate family had ever
been convicted of a DUI.

In this case, those having a family member

previously convicted were coded with a 1, while those not having a
family member convicted were assigned a 2.

Thus, it appears that those

respondents with other DUI convictions within their immediate families
exhibit slightly shorter lengths of residences than do families devoid
of previous DUI convictions.

Also, not surprisingly, length of

residence maintains a substantial correlation with respondent's age (R
.2204, P - .015).
For clearer interpretive analysis, the length of residency variabl
was again transformed, this time collapsing it into the following
categories:
(N - 24);

1) less than 1 year (N « 8);
3) 5-10 years (N - 9 ) ;

years (N - 14);

2) 1-5 years

4) 10-20 years (N - 33);

5) 20-30

6) 30-40 years (N - 4); and 7) 40-50 years (N - 3).

A oneway analysis of variance using the Scheffe's test procedure
was conducted, with no two groups appearing statistically significant a
the .10 confidence level.

The oneway yielded a F v alm

of 1.22 and on

probability level of .3034, a highly nonsignificant finding (See Table.
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14).

In fact, in an attempt to uncover some underlying trends in the

face of the insignificant difference of means tests, a breakdown of
scale means was conducted by length of residency groups.
Table 14
Onewav Analysis of Variance of Length of Residence and
Perception of Severity of Informal Sanctions

Source

Degrees of
Freedom

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Sauares

6

404.4529

67.4088

Within

87

4821.2067

55.4162

A.'■w'•„*.1
4

93

5225.6596

Between

F
Ratio
1.2164

F
Probability
.3057

However, little light is shed upon the possible existence of any
underlying trend in the mean score distributions.

Aside from those

respondents who had lived in their current community of residence for
less than 1 year (Group 1), all other averages varied quite little over
categories (See Table 15).

while the overall population maintained a

mean score of 33.98. Group 1 was substantial)/ higher, at 40.42. While
the hypothesis concerning this relationship would expect a significant
difference, it would expect it to be in the opposite direction (lower
rather than higher).

According to these findings (although they are not

statistically significant), those respondents having resided within
their present community are perceive the informal sanctions related to
their DUI as more severe than those who have lived in their respective
communities longer.

This could indicate some degree of social-

vulnerability in the early stages of the community-integration process,
although the data presented here is not adequate to support such a
theoretical explanation.
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Table 15
Mean Breakdown of Perception of Severity of
Informal Sanctions bv Leneth of Residence
Standard
Error

Group

N

Mean

Standard
Deviation

< 1 year

7

40.4286

11.2969

4.2698

yr s .

24

33.9167

7.8735

1.6072

5 - 10 yrs.

9

31.6667

7.3314

2.4438

10 - 20 yrs.

33

33.4848

6.9242

1.2054

20 - 30 yrs.

14

33.0000

6.9614

1.8605

30 - A0 y r s .

4

31.2500

2.7538

1.3769

40 - 50 yrs.

3

31.3333

2.5166

1.4530

1 - 5

Size of Current Community of Residence
The relationship between the size of respondent's community of
residence and their perception of severity of informal sanctions
states that, because of the more; anonymous and impersonal setting of
highly populated environments, respondents living within these areas
will perceive their DUI-related informal sanctions as less severe than
those residing in smaller more cohesive communities.

The variable

recording respondent's respective community of residence size is
comprised of the following categories:
2.500) (N - 9);

1.) farm (N — 6);

3.) small town (2,500-10,000)

(10.000-25,000) (N - 7);

(N = 7);

2.) rural (<
4.) town

5.) city (25,000-100,000) (N ™ 62); and 6.)

metropolitan (100,000+) (N ■= 8).
The Pearson's R correlation coefficient reveals almost no
measurable association between the size of respondent's community of
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residence and their perceived severity of informal sanctions
(R

- .0059, P = .477).

Further analysis reveals some noticable

differences, although the mean scores fluctuate in a way which is not
totally explainable.

While our hypothesis purports that those in

metropolitan areas will perceive the severity of informal sanctions as
lesser than more "personal" environments, it also assumes that such a
relationship is gradiated consistently and accordingly as size of
community of residence changes.

Judging from the mean values outlined

in Table 16, while the former statement appears to be partly justified,
any progressive coherence between the two is highly reluctant.

To

further substantiate the lack of statistical significance, a oneway
analysis of variance reveals an F value of 1.2258 at a probability level
of .3034 (See Table 17).

Thus, it seems the hypothesis which states

that community of origin size is a significantly discriminating variable
in the perception of severity of informal DUI-related sanctioning is not
supported by the data.
Table 16
dean Breakdown of Perception of Severity of
_________________Informal Sanctions bv Size of Community_______________
Standard
Deviation

Standard
Error

Group

N

farm

6

33.6667

5.5377

2.2608

rural

9

35.8889

7.8652

2.6217

small town

7

29.8571

7.2440

2.7380

town

7

33.2857

4.4615

1.6863

city

61

34.9672

7.8123

1.0003

8

29.8750

8.4251

2.9787

metro

Mean
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Table 17
Oneway Analysis of Variance of Size of Community of Residence
and Perception of Severi ty of Informal Sanctions

Source

Degrees of
Freedom

Sum of
Sauares

Mean
Sauares

5

349.1826

69.8365

Within

92

5241.3174

56.9708

Total

97

5590.5000

Between

F
Ratio
1.2258

F
Probability
.3034

Chapter V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This exploratory study was undertaken to investigate the effects of
certain personal and social characteristics on the perception of
severity of informal sanctions related to DUI.

The basic finding from

this research suggests that various elements appear to play a consistent
and theoretically specified role in the informal sanctioning of DUI
offenders, although in most cases the differences are statistically
significant at only a conservative magnitude.
Research into the perceived sanction fear of various formalized
punishments suggest that certainty, severity, and celerity play a
fundamental role in the deterrent function of sanctions.
the informal sanction, however, is still unknown.

The role of

Nonetheless,

speculative research might suggest that informal sanctions, like
formalized ones, are not applied to each individual offender at an equal
intensity or severity.

Oftentimes, this discrepancy is simply the

result of a lack cf appropriate significant others from which the most
severe informal sanctions usually originate.

At other times, the

socially-affixed "antennae" of the offender are not adequately
perceptive to recognize these negative social control forces, despite
their uncontested existance by others in the informal collective.
One characteristic which seems to radiate a measurable affects on
the severity of informal sanction perceptions is the gender of the
72
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offender.

An argument can be made that the offense of drinking-and-

driving, while maintaining a questionable status regarding it's
inclusion into the realm of "bonafide" deviant behavior, is nonetheless
considered largely a male offense.

That is, even those who partake in

deviant behavior are themselves subject to informal norms governing the
expected type of offender for that particular behavior.

Thus, females

as a whole do not constitute the overall societal perception of one who
is arrested for driving while impaired.

For this reason, informal

sanctioning toward females was shown to be noticeably higher in terms of
perceived severity.
Occupational status was also shown to constitute a moderately
significant factor in the perceived severity of DUI-related informal
sanctions.

Similar in nature to the relationship with respondent's

gender addressed earlier, those respondents who commanded more socially prestigious positions in the category of professional/managerial
indicated feeling the pressure of informal sanctions more than.did those
workers employed in the skilled or unskilled labor fields.

Although a

disproportionately low number of offenders are situated within this
highest occupational status group, perhaps a more epidemiological
approach could be taken to discern from offender characteristics exactly
whv certain social groups are consistently underrepresented in DUI
arrest statistics.
The lack of significant statistical findings when looking at the
constructed variable of social status is not surprising, as it appears
to have been a poor indicator of status due to the unweighted
contributions of occupational status, income, and education.

Analyzed

separately, however, the effect of each respective variable was more
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accurately discerned.

While attained educational levels showed their

lack of utility as a viable predictor of severity of informal sanction
scores, income was more significant if not considerably more
interesting.

Collapsed into four income brackets, the scale scores

increased steadily as income levels increased until the highest category
($40,000 and greater).
considerably.

At this level, the mean unexpectedly dropped off

Although this latter category is based upon only five

respondents, such a distribution is curious.

Certainly, regardless of

whether such an unusual distribution is found to be little more than a
statistical aberration, this finding seems ample cause for further
exploration•into the apparent relationship.
The basic premise concerning the effects of primary ties on
normative behavior is put forth by the social control theorists,
primarily Travis Hirschi.

According to this theory as it was initially

applied to juvenile delinquency, an individual's bond to society is the
primary factor affecting deviant behavior.

The marital status and the

presence of an socially-defined example -setting role of the respondent
as indicators of this social bond.

Marital status, however, proved to

be a poor predictor of perceived severity of informal sanctions.
Although those respondents who were divorced indicated the highest
scores in terms of perceived severity of sanctions, the mean scores
between those respondents reporting married and single marital status
did not vary considerably.
The presence of a socially-defined example-setting role also shed
little light on establishing this variable as a viable influence on
respondents' perceived severity of informal sanctions.

In fact,

although the difference of mean scores is far from significant, the
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direction of increase is opposite of that stated in the related
hypothesis.

Nonetheless, although the analysis fails to confirm this

hypothesis, the lack of significant difference is also a reasonably
sufficient factor to discourage prematurely specifying a theoretical
alternative.

Clearly, more research is needed in this area, perhaps

utilizing a more firmly grounded and established array of primary tie
indicants.
As previously stated, marital status appears to be a relatively
poor indicator regarding the severity of informal social sanctions, as
is the presence of an example-setting role.
the findings are more interesting.

Taken together, however,

While the marital status again

appears to be of little distinguishing effect, the presence of children
under the age of 18 living with the respondent appears to have an
heightening effect on both marital status groups (married and unmarried)
in terms of the perceived severity of social sanctions.

Again, such an

analysis is complicated due to the tremendous homogeneity of the sample
(young, male, single, etc.).
Another construct derived from Hirschi's Social Control Theory is
the community integration aspect of social bonding.

Firstly, the

variable which measured respondent's length of current residence was
used to test the hypothesis that, assuming longer residences resulted in
a greater integration into the community, length of residency should be
positively correlated with the perceived severity of informal sanctions.
The analysis of variance test, however, did not support this hypothesis,
in fact, the reverse was shown to exist, although not to a great extent.
That is, those -who had resided in their respective communities the
shortest amount of time (< 1 year) reported the highest mean score
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(greater severity of informal sanctions) of any other group. Admittedly,
judging from this, the failure to support this hypothesis may in fact
lie in the theoretical framework.

Although this may still be reflective

of a less integrated bonding into the community, it appears that
relative newcomers within their community environment are perceiving the
severity of their DUI-related informal sanctions to be much greater than
would be expected.

Perhaps this "pre-integration” stage is perceived as

an essential time in the social-integration process rather than a time
which allows one a sort of temporary semi-anonymous existence.
Lastly, some support was shown to support the hypothesis that the
size of the community of residence played a viable part in the
prediction of mean scale scores.

Although a statistically significant

difference was not established, the basic premise of the hypothesis was
supported.

Those respondents living within a small town environment

(<2,500) scored highest in terms of perceived severity of informal
sanctions, while those within metropolitan areas (100,000+) scored the
highest.

Potential Pol icy Implications

While the results discussed here are far from conclusive that
certain personal and social characteristics are accurate predictors of
DUI-related informal sanctioning, they should be interpreted
theoretically rather than statistically.

That is, the findings both in

support and in dissention of the stated hypotheses should serve as a
foundation for further research into the informal effects of DUI
sanctions on various types of offenders.
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For instance, a more precise and valid scale for measuring the
construct of informal sanctions can be derived from this study.

Also,

the content validity of the construct could easily be modified to
include other significant collectives thought to be a primary medium for
informal sanctions (i.e., the church).
Also, and perhaps most importantly, there should be a melding
together of formalized sanctioning entities with this future research
on the informalized effects.

From this, the courts and public interest

groups alike could adopt various deterrent strategies aimed at specific
social cohorts shown to be particularly susceptible to certain informal
sanctions.

Such an implementation could be effectively utilized at both

the general and the specific stages of DUI deterrence.

If the fear of

mandatory prescribed formal sanctions (fine, loss of license, etc.) is
simply a function of one's availability to resources (a good lawyer,
alternative transportation, etc.), perhaps punishment of another nature
should be prescribed drawing upon one's established fear of informal
sanctions.

A temporary loss of social status among those seemingly

immune to the formal implications of DUI may serve to better deter
themselves and others similar to them from driving while impaired.
Nonetheless, future research should focus upon this highly dynamic
force within this timely issue.

When further research can better

establish the relationships between informal sanctions and how they
affect various different members of society, then more effective
formalized sanctions can be implemented as a social deterrent to
drinking-and-driving.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A:
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOQY
Bo* 8192. University Station
Grand Forks. North Dakota 58202
(701) 777-2187

THE
UNIVERSITY

OF
NORTH
DAKOTA
As of late, you’ ve probably been on the listening end of most
conversations involving DUI and similar alcohol-related driving offenses.
I r o n i c a l l y , however, few studies have focused on the individual effects and
experiences of those people whose views actually matter. In this sense, you
are a valuable resource. The following short questionnaire is interested in
YOUR opinions on the subject.
F i l l i n g out this questionnaire is e n t i r e l y voluntary. It is not a
mandatory part of the DUI program and there are no sanctions or penalties of
any kind should you choose not to part icipa te. While your individual
viewpoints are essential , so is your freedom of choice. Whatever your
decision, I thank you for vour time and wish you the best in the future.
PI ease check one:

□

I wish to participate in the study by completing the attached
questionnaire.
I choose not to participate n the study and am returning the
uncompleted questionnaire to the s t a f f counselor.
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f i l l i n g out th is form w i l l only taka se v e ra l m inutes. Mott o f your answers
can be made sim ply by p la cin g a check mark In the box provided.
Although a
few questions may req u ire a»ore th in k in g than o th e rs , I t ’ s best to mark the
f i r s t response which occurs to you. A ll answers are s t r i c t 1y confI dent Ia l
and your p a r tlc Ip a tlo n Is t o t a l l y anonymous.' Vou CANNOT be 1dent I f l e d . so
fee! free to be honest In your responses.
1. li s t e d below are statem ents. w1 th which you may or may not agree.
Please
In d ic a te the extent o f your agreement or disagreement by checking the
appropriate box to the rig h t o f each s e le c tio n .
(«tror|J y

(mt »t*n|f
d1 TC
A

SA

(X !)

(X2 )

(X3)

(X4)

(X 5 )

(X6 )

(X 7 )

(X 8 )

(X9 )

(X !0 )

Neutral

0

SO

because of the tougher DUl law s, fewer
people are d r iv in g w h ile Impaired.

□

□

□

□

□

Someone who makes S5D.00C a ye a r Is Ju s t
as l i k e l y to be a rrested fo r DUI as
someone who makes I 15,000.

D

□

□

□

□

G e ttin g a DUI Is sim ply a m atter o f
odds. Everyone who d riv e s w hile
Im paired e v e n tu a lly lo s e s .

□

□

D

□

C~J

O v e r a ll, law enforcement agencies are
f a i r and unbiased In t h e ir apprehension
of Impaired d r iv e r s .

CD

a

□

Cj

□

Being arrested fo r OUI Is nothing more
than being In the wrong place a t the
wrong time.

□

□

□

□

Cj

CJ

□

□

D

□

□

1

□

□

□

CJ

□

□

□

□

□

a

□

□

l

n

□

□

CJ

CJ

Once you’ ve been a rre s te d for any one
a lc o h o l- re la te d d r iv in g o ffe n se , the
p o lic e have b a s ic a lly ’ got your number.*
Those arrested fo r d r iv in g w h ile Im paired
from the use c o n tr o lle d substances
(m a riju a n a , c o c a in e , e t c . ) should b*
tre a te d no d i f f e r e n t ly than those
a rre s te d - 7or d r iv in g impaired from
d rin k in g a lc o h o l.
Most people a rre s te d fo r DUI arc people
who have been d rin k in g and d r iv in g fo r
y e a rs .
Even a f t e r m u ltip le DUI a r r e s ts , most
people sim ply re tu rn to th e ir old ways
of try in g tc ’ beat the odds.*
Those most su ppo rtive o f tougher DUI
laws are people who are against d rin k in g
ra th e r than d r iv in g a f t e r d rin k in g .
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i

U

(X II)

Most OUI offender* are problem
a lc o h o lic s .

(X I 2)

Younger people stand a g rea te r chance
o f being arrested fo r OUI simply
because they h aven 't had enough p ra c tic e
at d riv in g w hile Im paired,

( X 13)

(X I 4)

fveryone arrested fo r OUI deserves
eve ryth in g they g et.
Nightclubs and other liq u o r
establishm ents have a public
r e s p o n s ib ilit y to help t h e ir customers
avoid d riv in g a f t e r d rin k in g .

(X15)

Compared to other crim es, the p e n a ltie s
le v ie d against OUI offenders are not
th a t bad.

(X16)

The p o lic e and the cou rts In some parts
o f North Dakota tr e a t DUIs tougher than
o th e rs .

(X I 7)

females a rre s te d fo r OUI are t y p i c a l l y
more m asculine and outgoing.

(X18)

( X I 9)

(X20)

<X2I)

(X22)

Because they are u n in te n tio n a l,
t r a f f i c In ju r ie s caused by Impaired
d r iv e r s should not be punishable by
prison sentences.
A ll cases o f OUI should not be tre a te d
the same by law because there are
d if f e r e n t circum stances In each In sta n ce.
There are times when d riv in g w h ile
Impaired should be overlooked sim ply
because I t cannot be avoided.
As long as no one Is h u rt, d r iv in g w h ile
Impaired should not be a crim e.
The b igg est part o f avoiding a DUI 1s
knowing how to a c t when stopped by the
p o lic e .

(X23)

Uonen con victe d o f OUI are more 1<kely to
get la rg e r fin e s than males.

(X26)

The p o s s i b i lit y o f someone a c t u a lly being
In ju re d by a drunk d r iv e r are very low.

(X 2 5 )

Anyone who can a ffo rd a good law yer can
beat a DUI rap , no m atter 1f they are
g u ilt y or not.
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$A

A

N eutra1

□

□

□

□ □

a

□

□

a

□

□

□

□ □

□

□

□

a □

□

□

a

□ a

□

□

□

□ a

□

□

□

□ □

□

□

□

□ □

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

C

□

□

□

□

□

a

□

□

a

□

□

□

□

□

n

a □

a

a

□

□ □

0

so

□

j

□ a

0

SA

(X26)

(X27)

A

Neutra 1

0

SO

Despite a ll the exposure, *o st people
s t i l l see DUI as t r a f f i c offense rather
than a crim e.

□

a

□

□

□

At one time or another, everyone who
d riv e s a f t e r d rin k in g thinks about
g e ttin g a OUI.

□

□

□

□

□

I I . Once a g a in , the fo llo w in g are statem ents w ith which you nay or may not
ayree .
Rather than genera) v ie w s , however, these statements p e rta in to your
own most recent experience.
Please In d ic a te the extent o f your agreement or
disagreement by checking the a p p ro p ria te box to the r ig h t o f each statem ent.
<*t rooi
«J! i«(r<

(• tro n *]y

A

SA

(2 1 )

(2 2 )

(2 3 )

(2 4 )

(2 5 )

(2 6 )

(2 7 )

(2 6 )

(2 9 )

Neutral

0

so

The thing th a t bothered »e most about
g e ttin g a 001 was how my fa m ily would
re a c t.

a

□

□

□

□

I'v e acted out 1n ray head what to say
and how to a c t I f I were ever stopped
by the p o lic e w h ile d riv in g drunk.

□

□

□

a

□

A fte r th is a r r e s t , I would v o lu n te e r
m yself as the ’ L if e o f the P a rty* fo r
an evening to ensure a sober rid e home
fo r ray fr ie n d s .

□

□

a

□

□

□

□

□

□

a

□

□

□

a

□

I d o n 't ca re what o th e rs n ig h t th in k
about my g e ttin g a DUI.

□

□

a

□

□

I f the names o f people a rrested fo r OUI
were p rin te d on the fro n t page o f the
hoaetown newspaper-, a rre s ts would
decrease n o tic e a b ly .

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

a

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

Before ay o ffe n s e , I was w ell aware o f
the consequences Involved w ith g e ttin g
a OUI.
I f stopped w h ile being le g a lly Im p aired ,
I'm co n fid e n t I could ‘ beat the rap"
on another DUI.

A fte r my a r r e s t , I w orried th a t ay
co-workers or fa m ily might th in k I had
a d rin k in g problem.
Most o f the a tte n tio n I got from «y
fatal ly regarding my OUI was l i t t l e rtore
than good natured kidd ing .

82

(Z10)

(Z l 1)

(Z l 2)

SA

A

H eyt r t 1

Because of my OU!, I no longer hive the
tame re la tio n s h ip with my superiors i t
work i t i did before.

□

□

□

!
Z
3 CD

My DUI was damaging to me because of
an o b lig a tio n ! have to s e ttin g a good
example at horse and/or at work.

□

□

□

L

The fin e and loss of licen se do esn 't even
come clo se to the s tra in pot on ray fam ily
and my personal 11 fe.

□

□

□

□ □

□

□

□ a

□

□

□

□ □

□

a

CH □ □

□

□

□

□ □

□

□

□

u

□

□

□

□ a

□

□

a

□

□

□

□

□ □

a

□

□

lJ

□

□

□

o a

□

□

□

LJ

□

□

□

CJ □

(Z l 3)

The fin e s end Increased Insurance rates
are tough, but not n early as bad as having
to make a p u blic appearance 1n c o u rt.

(Z li)

To me, g e ttin g caught was more
eabarasslng than the legal Im p lic a tio n s
o f a c t u a lly being a rrested .

( Z I 5)

Rather than being something to h id e , my
my OUI has earned the adm iration o f my
c lo s e s t fr ie n d s .

(Z I 6)

My fa m ily w asn 't su rprised when 1 got
my OUI.

(Z l 7)

The f i r s t thing I thought about a f t e r
being convicted fo r DUI was how I was
going to s u rv iv e without a d r iv e r s
1Icense.

(Z10)

(Z l 9)

i f I c o u ld 'v e arranged i t , I would have
payed an a d d itio n a l fin e tc have ray name
kept out o f the lo c a l newspaper.
Despite the thousands of d o lla rs generated
by fin e s eve ry y e a r, g ettin g a DC! is more
damaging s o c i a lly than f in a n c ia lly .

(Z20)

I f I volunteered to s ta y sober and d riv e
the e n tir e n ig h t, my frien d s would tease
me fo r "wimping out* on a good tim e.

(Z 2 I)

My g e ttin g a DUI has »ada my frie n d s
a lo t more fe a rfu l about d riv in g
drunk.

(2.22)

Embarassment hurts mere than
coney.

(Z2 31

f 1rvd I t d i f f i c u l t no* (0 drink
those around me are d rin k in g .

( Z 2 i)

* f te r being a rre s te d ,
was a f r a id people
would label me e drunk or an a lc o h o lic .

'

1f

i

D

j

so

CU

o

L J

□
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F

A

SA

(Z25)
(Z26)

I can avoid another DU! w ithout a lte r in g
my cu rren t 11fe s ty le .
Getting a DUI 1s a statu s symbol that
shows »y frie n d s I ' a a d rdlcated
p a r ty ie r .

so

0

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

a

□

Sex:

Date o f B ir t h :

Neutral

H

F

Which o f the fo llo w in g a lc o h o l- re la te d d r iv in g offenses req u ired you to
p a r tic ip a te in th is prograe? (check a l l th a t a p p ly .)
____ DUI (d r iv in g w hile Im paired)
____ APC (a ctu al physical c o n tr o l)
__ [ minor in possession
_____ open co n ta in e r
____ o t h e r : ___ __________________________________________________________________
Was th is your f i r s t such o ffe n s e ? _______ y e s . _______ no I f no, please
s p e c i f y : _________________________________________________________________________

Approximately how fa r from your home did the offense o ccu r? _______ m iles
were you given soar type of alcohol te s t (blood t e s t , i n t o x iiy t e r , e t c . ) ?
y e : ___ _ n o ______I f y e s , what was your blood-alcohol content? ____________

Are you c u rre n ly em ployed?______ y e s ______ no
occupat ion?

I f y e s , what is your'

What is your present m arital s ta tu s ?
_ s in g le , never a a rrte d
_
m arried
_____ separated

divorced
widowed

Ho*? many fam ily members (b r o th e r s , s i s t e r s , c h ild re n , e t c . )
of 18 c u r r e n tly li v e with you?

Meuse in d ic a te the stye of the ccenunity

in which you p re s e n tly liv e -

_____ f# 'T
______ -ural (le s s than ?,S 0 0 )
_____ small town ( ? .800-1 0,000 )

How l ong have you r e s i d e d

under the age

town (10,000- '/.'j ,000)
c i t y ( ? S , 000-100,000)
m etrop olitan (Over 100,000)

In t h i s

location?

3

A

pl ease c ! r c I e one
_ ye a r s months

Which of tha fo llo w in g c a te g o rie s best describes your net household
Income fo r the pest y e a r? (approxim ate Income e f t e r ta x e t)
$25,000
$30,000
$35,000
$40,000
$45,000
$50,000

JO - $4,999
$5,000 - $9,999
$10,000 - $14,999
$15,000 - $19,999
$20,000 - $24,999

- $29,999
- $34 ,999
- $39,999
- $44,999
- $49,999
or above

What Is the hig hest grade you completed In sch o o l?
1 through 8

______ 13-15 (some c o lle g e or
tra d e scho ol)

9 through 11
______ 12 {high school grad)

______ 16 ♦ (c o lle g e grad or more)

lias anyone 1n your Immediate fa m ily e v e r gotten a DUI? ______ yes ______ no

At what age do you f i r s t remember r id in g as a passenger 1n a c a r w ith someone
who was Im paired? _____________ ye a rs old

How old were you the f i r s t
______________ ye a rs old

time you drove when you f e l t le g a l ly im paired?

Going back 1 ye a r from the time you were c ite d fo r DUI, approxim ately how many
times have you d riv e n a motor v e h ic le when you f e l t you were le g a l ly Im parled?
(check o n e).
none
1-5
6-10
11-20
21-30

31-40
41-50
51-60
61-70

71-80
81-90
91-100
over 100

Try and remember back to the exact moment you were a rre s te d fo r DUJ. Who
was the f i r s t person you w orried about fin d in g o u t? ( e x . , boss, rooemate,
e t c . ) __________________________________________ __________________________ ______________

Coorien ts:

THANK YOU FOR TOUR COOPERATION!
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APPENDIX B:
RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS

Reliability Analysis of Informal Sanctioning Scale
Scale Items
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

ZI
Z6
Z7
Z10
Zll
Z12
Z13
Z14
Z16
Z18
Z19
Z22
Z24

Bothered me the most was family reaction
Don't care what others think about my DUI
Arrests would decline if names printed in front page
No longer have the same relationship with co-workers
Damaging to my obligation at work/home
Fine/loss of .license not as great as effect on family
Fine/insurance rates not as bad as court appearance
Getting caught more embarassing than legal impacts
My family was not surprised with my DUI
Would have paid extra to have name kept out of paper
DUI is more embarassing socially than financially
Embarassment'hurts more than money
Afraid of being labeled a drunk or an alcoholic

Item-Total Statistics

T tern
Zl
Z6
Z7
Z10
Z12
Z13
Z14
Z16
Z18
Z19
Z22
Z24

Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
31.3261
30.9457
31.4674
32.0217
31.5326
31.9457
31.4891
30.6304
31.6957
31.7174
31.4457
31.5543

Alpha if
Item Deleted
.8046
.7999
.8041
.8133
.7882
.7944
.8081
.8164
.7854
.7961
.7902
.7927

Number of Items —• 13

Number of Cases = 92
Number of Missing Cases - 8

Alpha =» 0.8123
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